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Notes on Francis Fukuyama - The End of History
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Notes on Francis Fukuyama, “The End of History?”
As the end of the century [in this case the end of the 80s] approaches, the triumph of Western
liberal democracy again seems the inevitability that it did at the turn of the previous century.
This is an absolute triumph of the Western idea. It is seen in the failure of all viable alternative
ideas, and also in the spread of consumer culture around the world. This may signal the end of
history in the sense of humanity’s ideological evolution, and the universalization of Western
culture.
Note: all summary of Hegel’s philosophy is taken strait from Fukuyama. If you don’t like the
interpretation, blame Frank, not me.
The end of history is a concept most often associated with Marx, but appearing earlier in his
predecessor Hegel. Hegel was (according to Fukuyama) the first philosopher who saw man as a
product of his historical and social environment. But unlike later historicists, Hegel did not turn
to complete relativism. Rather he saw history as moving towards a point at which a final,
rational form of society and state would become victorious. This victory, in Hegel’s view, was
achieved in 1806 when Napoleon defeated the Prussian monarchy at the Battle of Jena. This was
the victory of the ideals of the French Revolution, liberty and equality, over those of the old
order. During the middle of the century, at some of the most turbulent times, Alexandre Kojeve,
a Russia emigre in France, was teaching that the flabby, weak-willed, prosperous states of
Western Europe were forming the “universal homogenous state” predicted by Hegel with the
coming of the end of history.
Hegel saw history as driven by contradictions that existed first and foremost on the level of
ideas. Human behavior is the rooted in prior state of consciousness. In other words, ideas,
mores, habits, religion and ideology, etc. begin as ideas, which can develop autonomously of the
material world. Ultimately, however, these ideas determine human behavior (albeit perhaps with
a lag time while the idea is spread and internalized). This is the absolute reverse of materialist
thought (Marxist and otherwise) which holds that ideas are absolutely caused by material factors.
Fukuyama uses examples from Weber’s The Protestant Ethic and the Spirit of Capitalism, as
well as other anecdotes of different cultures behaving very differently (Spartan and Athenian,
capitalist entrepreneur and aristocrat) to highlight the importance of ideas. Turning to the recent
past, Hegel notes that the success of the NICS in Asia that are often used to prove materialism,
actually may reflect cultural factors. He also notes that the reform movements in China and the
Soviet Union could not be traced simply to material factors, which would have called for a
change long before it occurred. Hegel, it should be noted, saw the victory at Jena as the victory
of the idea. It would not be implemented fully for some time, but the truth had been reached
ideologically, and it could not be improved upon. Fukuyama closes this section by noting that
ideas clearly are affected by material factors. He separates himself from the teleological claims
of Hegel, claiming that the absolute validity of Hegel’s argument is not important. What is
important is what it suggests about the importance of ideas. Finally, he notes that he does not
say that liberal economics causes liberal politics, but rather that both have their roots in the same
liberal ideas. Finally, he summarizes the “content of the universal homogenous state as liberal
democracy in the political sphere combined with easy access to VCRs and stereos in the