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FEATURE

DOI: 10/joe.

26 © 2017 Wiley Periodicals, Inc. wileyonlinelibrary/journal/joe Global Business and Organizational Excellence. 2017;36(5):26–35.

Zara from Spain and Uniqlo of Japan are leading firms in the fast fashion sector
of the textile and apparel industry. An analysis of their corporate history and op-
erational strategies explains their success in a highly competitive global environ-
ment. Maintaining distinct competitive advantages in brand visibility and quality,
they continue to prosper through their ability to respond to consumer tastes, seek
economies of scale through their global value chains, cultivate supplier networks
that contain prices, and keep pace with Web-based marketing platforms and online
retailing trends. Their experiences offer valuable lessons in growth and international
expansion.

1 | INTRODUCTION

Characterized by a variety of business models, competitive
supply chains, and niche endeavors, fast fashion firms make
up a major sector in the global textile and apparel industry.
Two of these firms, Zara and Uniqlo, have capitalized on
their ability to quickly manufacture clothing that reflect the
latest trends at an affordable price to become major players in
their field. Articles about each of the companies in The Wall
Street Journal , published 10 months apart, attest to the firms’
quick internationalization, sustained competitive advantages,
and well-formulated global strategies (Negishi, Mattioli, &
Dezember, 2013; Roman & Kemble-Diaz, 2012).
Along with their competitors in the fast fashion sector, such as
H&M, Gap, and Benetton, (see Exhibit 1 ) Zara and Uniqlo have
made significant strides in promptly responding to consumer
needs and fashion movements. These include a new “ paradigm
change ” in the apparel industry (Choi, 2011, p. 85) and efficient
distribution systems (Gallien, Mersereau, Garro, Mora, & Vidal,
2015). Both Zara and Uniqlo employ business models that are
staunchly competitive and oriented toward global growth.

2 | TWO COMPETITORS FROM

DIFFERENT PARTS OF THE GLOBE

Founded by Amancio Ortega Gaona in Arteixo, Spain, in
1974, Zara is part of Inditex, a Spanish multinational. In 2016
Forbes magazine ranked Ortega the second richest person in
the world, with a net worth of $67 billion. Headquartered in
Tokyo, Uniqlo’s history goes back to 1949. It is a subsidiary
of Fast Retailing, which was founded by Tadashi Yanai. With
a net worth of $14 billion, he is ranked the richest person in
Japan (Forbes, 2016). Both companies have achieved remark-
able success and visibility in an industry with complex global
value chains (GVCs) and diverse markets, and they continue
to grow globally. Exhibit 2 and Exhibit 3 (page 28) outline
the firms’ development since their founding.

2 | Zara: Quick to go global

Throughout its expansion, Zara has remained competitive
thanks to its fast-paced internationalization and niche-based
supply chains, which include specialized and well-established
suppliers in the textile and apparel industry (Gallien et al.,
2015; García-Álvarez, 2015; Martinez, Errasti, & Rudberg,
2015; Tokatli, 2014; Zara, 2013−2017).
In 1963, Amancio Ortega Gaona (founder and chairman of
Inditex) entered the clothing business and grew his firm into a
major brand in Europe. Zara’s first store was opened in 1974 in
A Coruña, Spain. Between 1976 and 1984, Zara opened addi-
tional stores in various major cities throughout Spain. In 1985,
Inditex took the form of an apparel industry holding company
and from 1986 to 1987, the group focused on its Zara brand,
developing an extensive distribution system aimed at efficient

Zara vs. Uniqlo: Leadership strategies in the competitive

textile and apparel industry

Syed Tariq Anwar

operations. Additional stores were opened in Porto, Portugal;
Paris; and New York. Between 1991 and 1997, the company
acquired Pull & Bear (formerly New Wear, S.) and the
Massimo Dutti Group, another apparel company from Spain.
In 1998, Zara launched Bershka, another clothing brand for
young women and teenage girls. Additional Zara stores were
subsequently opened in the United Kingdom, Turkey, Argentina,
Venezuela, United Arab Emirates, Japan, Kuwait, Lebanon,
and elsewhere (Zara, 2013−2017).
In 2007, Zara established an online store and opened two
distribution centers: one in Hubsin Meco outside Madrid and
one in Onzonilla in the province of León, Spain. Zara’s new
stores locations included Croatia, Colombia, Guatemala, and
Oman. In 2010, the Zara Group operated in 77 countries with
5,000 stores and introduced a new strategic environmental
plan, “Sustainable Inditex 2011-2015,” which was aimed at
sustainable development, eco-friendly environmental prac-
tices, and related areas of sustainability and awareness.
Zara went on to launch Uterqüe, a retailer of fashion acces-
sories, and to open a new distribution center in Palafolls in
the province of Barcelona. In 2013, Zara recreated and repo-
sitioned its image based on four principles: beauty, clar-
ity, functionality, and sustainability. Additional stores were
opened in Armenia, Bosnia-Herzegovina, Ecuador, Georgia,
and Macedonia. In 2013, the total number of stores worldwide
reached 6,000. Zara has been ranked among the top 40 brands
in the world (Interbrand, 2016; MillwardBrown, 2016), and
as of 2017, the company continues to expand in global markets
and remains a successful fast fashion brand (Bonnin, 2002).

2 | A more cautious approach at Uniqlo

Uniqlo’s roots go back to 1949 with the founding of Ogori
Shoji in Ube City in Japan’s Yamaguchi Prefecture. In 1963,
Ogori Shoji Co., Ltd., had a capital of 6 million yen. An off-
shoot of Ogori Shoji, Uniqlo opened its first store in 1984, in
Hiroshima. The following year, the Uniqlo store in Yamagu-
chi Prefecture was opened with great success and publicity.

EXHIBIT 1 Fast fashion and related brands in the global textile and apparel industry (2014–2017)

*American Apparel ( US ) *Benetton ( Italy ) *Bershka ( Spain ) *Bestseller ( Denmark ) *C&A ( Belgium/Germany ) *Charles & Keith ( Singapore ) *Charlotte Russe ( US ) *Cotton On ( Australia ) *8seconds ( South Korea ) *Esprit ( Germany ) *Comme ça ism ( Japan ) *Forever 21 ( US ) *Gap ( US ) *Giordano ( Hong Kong ) *H&M ( Sweden ) *H: Connect ( Japan ) *Kiabi ( France ) *Lolly Wolly Doodle ( US ) *Mango ( Spain ) *Metersbonwe ( China ) *Miss Selfridge ( UK ) *Mixxo ( South Korea ) *New Look ( UK ) *NewYorker ( Germany ) *Next ( UK ) *Peacocks ( UK ) *Primark ( Ireland ) *Pull & Bear ( Spain ) *Rainbow Shops ( US ) *Renner ( Brazil ) *Riachuelo ( Brazil ) *River Island ( UK ) *rue21 ( US ) *Shasa ( US ) *Teddy ( Italy ) *Topshop ( UK ) *Urban Outfitters ( US ) *Wet Seal ( US ) *Uniqlo ( Japan ) *Zara ( Spain ) *Zalando ( Germany )

Source: Caro and Martínez-de-Albéniz (2014), company websites, Financial Times (various issues), Ranker (2017); The Wall Street Journal (various issues).

EXHIBIT 2 Zara vs. Uniqlo: Corporate and financial data (2015–2016)

Zara Name Zara Expaña S. Parent company Industria de Diseño Textil (Inditex, Arteixo, Spain) Country of origin/ headquarters

Arteixo, Spain

Year founded 1974 Founders Amancio Ortega Gaona; Rosalía Mera Revenue $9 billion (Inditex: $22 billion) Number of stores 2,169 (Inditex: 7,084) Major competitors Benetton (Italy); Gap (US); H&M (Sweden); El Corte Inglés (Spain); Uniqlo (Japan) Uniqlo Name Uniqlo Company Limited Parent company Fast Retailing Company (Tokyo, Japan) Country of origin/ headquarters

Tokyo, Japan

Year founded 1949 Founders Tadashi Yanai Revenue $4 billion Number of stores 958 Major competitors Benetton (Italy); Gap (US); H&M (Sweden); El Corte Inglés (Spain); Zara (Spain)

Source: Uniqlo (2013−2017), Zara (2013−2017), Financial Times (various issues), The Wall Street Journal (various issues).

affording a livelihood to many people in every country in the
world” (Kunz, Karpova, & Garner, 2016, p. 2).
The members of this industry are diverse in size, value-
added activities, and GVCs, which affect other business sec-
tors and entire countries worldwide (Browne, 2016; Gimet,
Guilhon, & Roux, 2015; Kapelko & Lansink, 2015a, 2015b;
Rivoli, 2009; Seyoum, 2007; The Economist , 2012, 2016). In
2015, the $3 trillion global textile and apparel industry accounted
for 2% of global GDP (Business2Community, 2015).
Massive in reach and impact, the industry is strongly influenced

EXHIBIT 4 Internationalization and global operations of Zara and Uniqlo (2017)

Africa: Egypt, Morocco, South Africa, Algeria

Asia-Pacific: Indonesia, Macau, South Korea, Thailand, Kazakhstan, China, Taiwan, Japan,Hong Kong

Oceania: Australia

Americas Brazil, Canada, Chile, Colombia, Costa Rica, Guatemala, Honduras, Mexico, Panama, Paraguay, Peru, Dominican Republic, USA, Uruguay ZARA Europe: Andorra, Denmark, Spain, Estonia, Croatia, Ireland, Latvia, Luxemburg, Monaco, Norway, Portugal, Switzerland, Slovenia, Finland, Turkey, Austria, Greece, Bulgaria, Belgium, Germany, Canary Islands, France, Hungary, Italy, Lithuania, Malta, Netherlands, Poland, Romania, Serbia, Slovakia, Sweden, UK, Czech Republic, Cyprus,Russia

Middle East: Bahrain, Jordan, Kuwait, Lebanon, Oman, Qatar, Saudi Arabia,UAE

Asia-Pacific: Japan, China, Hong Kong, Taiwan, South Korea, Singapore, Malaysia, Thailand, Philippines, Indonesia

UNIQLOOceania: Australia

Europe: France, UK, Germany, Belgium, Spain,Russia

North America : USA,Canada

Source: Uniqlo (2013−2017); Zara (2013−2017).

EXHIBIT 5 Sales of selected firms in the fast fashion sector (2015–2016)

0

5

10

15

20

25

Inditex (Zara) H&MGap Uniqlo Beneon

Sales (in US

$ billion)

(Color figure can be viewed at wileyonlinelibrary.)

Source: The Economist, Financial Times, The Wall Street Journal (various issues).

by its complex supplier networks and regulatory standards
(Amador & Cabral, 2016; Gereffi & Luo, 2015; Gereffi & Lee,
2016; Los, Timmer, & de Vries, 2015; Mudambi & Puck, 2016;
Timmer, Erumban, Los, Stehrer, & de Vries, 2014). Histori-
cally, the global textile and apparel industry has been affected
by various countries’ labor and other regulatory policies and
multilateral agreements from the European Union, the World
Trade Organization, the World Bank, and other organizations
(Ahmed & Peerlings, 2009; Saliola & Zanfei, 2009).
Divided into men’s wear, women’s wear, and children’s
wear sectors, the apparel industry’s sales are based on the
retail selling price of the manufactured garments. With total
revenues of $633 billion, the women’s wear segment is the
most profitable—in large measure because of ever changing
fashions and aggressive marketing worldwide (Kunz, Kar-
pova, & Garner, 2016; MarketResearch, 2013).
Suppliers’ resources, locations, infrastructure, and net-
works are critical to the industry. Exhibit 6 provides an over-
view of the textile and apparel industry’s GVCs. There are
four key players in the supply chain.
  • Textile mills. These include fiber, yarn, and thread mills,
as well as fabric manufacturers. There are also fabric fin-
ishing and fabric coating mills.
  • Textile product mills. These encompass designers, fin-
ishing mills, and product mills (for nonapparel textile
products, such as towels, sheets, and related items).
  • Apparel manufacturers. These include apparel knitting
mills; facilities that design, cut and sew apparel; and
those that manufacture accessories.
  • Retail outlets and marketing firms. These include depart-
ment stores, specialty stores, mass merchandisers, dis-
count stores, off-price retailers, and miscellaneous
retailers (Oyson, 2011).
Because of the involvement of a wide variety of firms in
the manufacturing process and retail operations, supply and
value chains in the apparel industry can be complicated and
interrelated. This affects pricing, delivery procedures, qual-
ity standards, and country-specific policies and regulations
(Hassler, 2003, 2004; Kadarusman & Nadvi, 2013; Kaplin-
sky & Farooqi, 2010; Kunz & Garner, 2007; Kunz, et al.,
2016; Su, 2013; Wenting & Freken, 2011).

4 | INTERNATIONALIZATION

STRATEGIES AT ZARA AND

UNIQLO

The literature of global strategy reveals that the internation-
alization process is dynamic because of multinational firms’
diverse markets and businesses (Anwar, 2015, 2016). Lead-
ing to new markets and further opportunities for growth,
global strategies, and orientation are essential to long-term

EXHIBIT 6 Global value chains in the textile and apparel industry

I. Textile Mills *Fiber, Yarn & Thread Mills *Yarn Spinning Mills *Yarn Thread Mills *Fabric Mills *Broad Woven Fabric *Narrow Fabric Mills *Nonwoven Fabric Mills *Knit Fabric Mills *Textile & Fabric Finishing & Fabric Coating Mills

II. Textile ProductMills *Textile Furnishing Mills *Carpet & Rug Mills *Curtain & Linen Mills *Other Textile Product Mills

III. Apparel Manufacturers *Apparel Knitting Mills Hosiery & Sock MillsSheer Hosiery Mills Other Apparel Knitting MillsOutwear Knitting Mills *Underwear/Nightwear Knitting Mills Cut & Sew Apparel ManufacturingCut & Sew Apparel Contractors *Men’s and Boy’s Cut Sew Apparel Manufacturers *Women’s & Girls Cut & Sew Apparel Manufacturers Other Cut & Sew Apparel ManufacturingInfants’ Cut & Sew Apparel Manufacturers *Fur & Leather Apparel Manufacturers *Apparel Accessories & Other Manufacturing

IV. Retail Outlets & Marketing Firms Department stores; specialty stores; mass merchandisers; discount stores; off-price retailers; online retailers

Source: Adapted from Kunz and Garner (2007, p. 38); Kunz, Karpova and Garner (2016, p. 68). Also see Fernandez-Stark, Frederick and Gereffi (2011, pp. 1–18); Gereffi and Memedovic (2003, p. 5).

from competitors that imitate their operational and market-
ing strategies. In the fast fashion sector, technology and the
growth of niche companies have made it easier for competi-
tors to copy new trends. This is particularly a problem in the
Asian and South American markets, where small and mid-
size firms have proven to be agile and resilient. Growth in the
fast fashion sector has been spurred by online retailing, which
has become a major competitive tool. Web-based business
models are complex, however, and can present technological
and logistical obstacles. Both Zara and Uniqlo have taken on
these challenges with their Web-based businesses and plan
on becoming ever more active players in this area.

4 | Future prospects for Zara and Uniqlo

As of 2017, Zara and Uniqlo remain major global brands in
the fast fashion industry and appeal to diverse markets and
niche segments. Valued at more than $1 trillion, the global
apparel industry touches every corner of the world. Offer-
ing iconic products and brand innovation, Zara and Uniqlo
are noted for their unique designs and profitable customer
loyalty (Hubert et al., 2017; Jindal, Sarangee, Echambadi, &
Sangwon, 2016; Kumar, Bezawada, Rishika, Janakiraman,
& Kannan, 2016). As shown in Exhibits 4 and 7, both have
the extensive sales networks and organizational capabilities
needed to operate globally.
Regarding corporate-specific resources, capabilities, and
brand identity (von Wallpach, Hemetsberger, & Espersen,
2017; Zollo, Bettinazzi, Neumann, & Snoeren, 2016), Zara is
much stronger than Uniqlo, particularly in Europe. The com-
pany has become adept at producing fast fashion aligned with
local tastes. This capability is a major asset that likely will
lead to further growth and internationalization for Zara. The
company’s brands are also well known in emerging markets.
Uniqlo is comparatively new to global markets and remains a
low-profile player in North America and emerging markets.
Supplier networks are critical to internationalization and
long-term growth. Whereas Zara announced a major initia-
tive regarding internationalization and expansion (Mulligan
2010), Uniqlo has often sought organic growth based on high
traffic areas and regional markets. Although the company
wants to expand in Asia and North America in order to take
advantage of consumer demand and growth opportunities
there (Negishi, Mattioli, & Dezember, 2013), Uniqlo remains
wary of its competitors in those regions. It will likely take
Uniqlo several years before it can be the size of Zara.
Both companies have encountered a variety of problems in
emerging as well as developed markets (Dudley, Devnath, &
Townsend, 2013) and face a host of industry-specific trends
(see Exhibit 8 ). Competition for young consumers around
the world has intensified. At the same time, it is difficult to
expand operations in countries whose markets are dominated
by local brands. Zara and Uniqlo often have to contend with
fast emerging firms that imitate their business models and
organizational systems. In emerging markets they also often
have to deal with consumers’ tendency to favor native busi-
nesses, as well as with protectionist government regulations
and local textile monopolies. Textile-related environmental
regulations are another concern, demanding bold initiatives,
new strategies, and financial resources. The companies’ pre-
vious experiences in this area can be important in developing
timely and appropriate responses in this regard.
Sourcing has become a particularly critical issue in the
textile industry (Puranam, Gulati, & Bhattacharya, 2013).
The global textile and apparel industry depends heavily on
cotton as a raw material. In recent years, cotton prices have
gone up because of supply shortages, weather-related disrup-
tions, competition, and government policies. As a result, raw

EXHIBIT 8 Global textile and apparel industry: Changing business environment and industry-specific trends (2016–2017)

Major Issues and Variables Business Environment and Industry Trends Company-specific issues: Size of the global apparel industry and its retail sectors surpass $1 trillion. Industry-specific issues: The apparel industry is a global industry that provides millions of jobs and business opportunities to large and small firms. Transaction costs have gone up because of rising prices of raw material (cotton) and other inputs. Technology-specific issues: New innovations and technologies are critical in the apparel industry. These require financial capital and established networks. Cost-specific issues: Cost of raw material (cotton) has gone up. Only well established companies with infrastructure have the financial resources to get into new markets and expand globally. Competition in global markets: Industry competitors are many and competition is intense, creating diverse markets and complex segments. Global value chains: Global value chains are dynamic, complex and mostly buyer-driven. Supplier networks often change and can be costly for new entrants as well as established manufacturers. Future trends: Demand in emerging markets and developed countries is expected to grow. Globalization and craving for efficient supply chains have been heightened. Internationalization and growth are available to cash-rich manufacturers that plan on expanding in global markets.

Source: Bloomberg Businessweek, The Economist , Financial Times , The Wall Street Journal (various issues). Also see Fernandez-Stark, Frederick & Gereffi (2011, pp. 1–18); Gereffi and Memedovic (2003, pp. 1–25).

material costs for Zara, Uniqlo, and other fast fashion firms
have increased.
The GVCs that these fashion houses depend on are taking
new forms and becoming more complex because of emerging
technologies, limitations on the availability of raw materi-
als, and changes in manufacturing ( The Economist , 2016).
Traditionally operating in China, Pakistan, India, and Turkey,
GVCs have emerged in the new textile centers of Bangladesh,
Vietnam, and Cambodia. In fact, Bangladesh has become the
world’s second largest exporter of apparel, after China (Vara,
2016). Although traditional manufacturing centers will con-
tinue to be part of the global textile and apparel industry,
fashion houses will continue to look for low transaction cost
networks and operational efficiencies available in developing
countries.
Every business is heavily influenced by the Internet, Web-
based business models, social media, and supplier networks
(Felix, Rauschnabel, & Hinsch, 2017; Kumar et al., 2016).
Zara and Uniqlo have pursued global strategies that are
informed by the Web and social media as well (Gamboa &
Gonçalves, 2014). Tapping into the trend of offering custom-
ers both value and a “journey” that encourages interaction
and identification with a product (Kumar & Reinartz, 2016;
Lemon & Verhoef, 2016), Zara and Uniqlo use social media
and Web-based models to target their diverse markets and
niche segments.

5 | LESSONS LEARNED ON THE

PATH TO SUCCESS

The experiences of Zara and Uniqlo show that firm-specific
strategies are critical when seeking global expansion (Pari-
etti, 2015). Zara from Spain remains a first-mover global
brand when dealing with internationalization and long-term
growth. Japan’s Uniqlo, on the other hand, is a low-profile
player that remains cautious in its global expansion. From
both a practitioner’s and an academic’s perspective, a review
of their business growth points to the following lessons:
  • In the fast fashion sector of the textile and apparel
industry, internationalization is available to companies
that capitalize on changing markets and new opportu-
nities. Well-planned global strategies combine needed
resources and the right GVCs. Supplier networks and
timely logistics and distribution are particularly critical
when meeting demand beyond national borders.
  • Efficient supply chains and networks are particularly
important when dealing with diverse segments and
competitive markets. Because of its well-established
model and brand identity, which set it apart from the
competition, Zara has an edge in negotiating business
relationships.
  • Stable organizational structures contribute to consistent
growth in domestic and global markets. Both Zara and
Uniqlo have capitalized on their operational efficiencies
and brand identity in their markets at home and abroad.
  • Industry practitioners need to monitor global trends in
the niche segments that are critical in the fast fashion
sector, such as fashion consciousness, prestige sensitiv-
ity, and brand appeal (Casidy, 2012). Consumer attitudes
regarding such topics are particularly important when
dealing with millennials in the global textile and apparel
industry.
While serving their various stakeholders, Zara and Uniqlo
have focused on customer-centric growth (Simon, van den
Driest, & Wilms, 2016). From a marketing perspective, the
two companies engender loyalty and psychological owner-
ship among their consumers because of good quality and
reasonable prices (Sinclair & Tinson, 2017). Thanks to their
efficient GVCs, well-tested business models, and distinct
core competencies (which include company- and product-
specific knowledge and R&D) and competitive advantages,
Zara and Uniqlo have shown themselves to be indefatigable
in their quest to remain at the top of the global textile and
apparel industry’s fast fashion segment.

ACKNOWLEDGEMENT

An earlier version of this article was presented at the 2014
Southwest Case Research Association (SWCRA) Conference
in Dallas, Texas, March 12–13, 2014, where it received the
2014 McGraw-Hill Education Distinguished Paper Award.
The author thank two anonymous reviewers as well as con-
ference session presenters Lawrence Silver, Steve Vitucci,
Rodney C. Vandeveer, Michael Menefee, and John K. Mas-
ters for their helpful comments and suggestions.
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AUTHOR BIOGRAPHY
S YED T ARIQ A NWAR , DBA, MBA, is a professor of marketing
and international business in the Department of Management,
Marketing & General Business at the College of Business,
West Texas A&M University in Canyon, Texas. He received
his MA in public administration from University of the Punjab
in Lahore, Pakistan, and his DBA and MBA degrees from U.
International University. Dr. Anwar’s research interests are
international marketing, global strategy, globalization, emerg-
ing markets, international joint ventures, and mergers and
acquisitions. He can be reached at sanwar@mail.wtamu.
How to cite this article : Anwar ST. Zara vs. Uniqlo:
Leadership strategies in the competitive textile and
apparel industry. Global Business and Organizational
Excellence. 2017;36:26–35. doi/10.1002/
joe.
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Uniqlo - case study

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FEATURE
DOI: 10.1002/joe.21805
26 © 2017 Wiley Periodicals, Inc. wileyonlinelibrary.com/journal/joe Global Business and Organizational Excellence. 2017;36(5):26–35.
Zara from Spain and Uniqlo of Japan are leading firms in the fast fashion sector
of the textile and apparel industry. An analysis of their corporate history and op-
erational strategies explains their success in a highly competitive global environ-
ment. Maintaining distinct competitive advantages in brand visibility and quality,
they continue to prosper through their ability to respond to consumer tastes, seek
economies of scale through their global value chains, cultivate supplier networks
that contain prices, and keep pace with Web-based marketing platforms and online
retailing trends. Their experiences offer valuable lessons in growth and international
expansion.
1
|
INTRODUCTION
Characterized by a variety of business models, competitive
supply chains, and niche endeavors, fast fashion firms make
up a major sector in the global textile and apparel industry.
Two of these firms, Zara and Uniqlo, have capitalized on
their ability to quickly manufacture clothing that reflect the
latest trends at an affordable price to become major players in
their field. Articles about each of the companies in The Wall
Street Journal, published 10 months apart, attest to the firms’
quick internationalization, sustained competitive advantages,
and well-formulated global strategies (Negishi, Mattioli, &
Dezember, 2013; Roman & Kemble-Diaz, 2012).
Along with their competitors in the fast fashion sector, such as
H&M, Gap, and Benetton, (see Exhibit 1) Zara and Uniqlo have
made significant strides in promptly responding to consumer
needs and fashion movements. These include a new “paradigm
change” in the apparel industry (Choi, 2011, p. 85) and efficient
distribution systems (Gallien, Mersereau, Garro, Mora, & Vidal,
2015). Both Zara and Uniqlo employ business models that are
staunchly competitive and oriented toward global growth.
2
|
TWO COMPETITORS FROM
DIFFERENT PARTS OF THE GLOBE
Founded by Amancio Ortega Gaona in Arteixo, Spain, in
1974, Zara is part of Inditex, a Spanish multinational. In 2016
Forbes magazine ranked Ortega the second richest person in
the world, with a net worth of $67 billion. Headquartered in
Tokyo, Uniqlos history goes back to 1949. It is a subsidiary
of Fast Retailing, which was founded by Tadashi Yanai. With
a net worth of $14.6 billion, he is ranked the richest person in
Japan (Forbes, 2016). Both companies have achieved remark-
able success and visibility in an industry with complex global
value chains (GVCs) and diverse markets, and they continue
to grow globally. Exhibit 2 and Exhibit 3 (page 28) outline
the firms’ development since their founding.
2.1
|
Zara: Quick to go global
Throughout its expansion, Zara has remained competitive
thanks to its fast-paced internationalization and niche-based
supply chains, which include specialized and well-established
suppliers in the textile and apparel industry (Gallien et al.,
2015; García-Álvarez, 2015; Martinez, Errasti, & Rudberg,
2015; Tokatli, 2014; Zara, 2013−2017).
In 1963, Amancio Ortega Gaona (founder and chairman of
Inditex) entered the clothing business and grew his firm into a
major brand in Europe. Zaras first store was opened in 1974 in
A Coruña, Spain. Between 1976 and 1984, Zara opened addi-
tional stores in various major cities throughout Spain. In 1985,
Inditex took the form of an apparel industry holding company
and from 1986 to 1987, the group focused on its Zara brand,
developing an extensive distribution system aimed at efficient
Zara vs. Uniqlo: Leadership strategies in the competitive
textile and apparel industry
Syed Tariq Anwar