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Philosophy - Abortion Essay
Equity and Trusts (LW202-5-SP-CO)
University of Essex
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Registration number: 1804060 Module Code: PY Word Count: 1, Is it possible to offer a defence of abortion that does not also make infanticide morally permissible? Critically analyse the arguments found in Warren, Tooley, and Thomson in light of this question.
The defences of abortion that appear to adhere to the practising of infanticide make it seemingly hard to differentiate the two and so the latter might be regarded as morally permissible. Whereas, when we defend abortion with the notion that a fetus is not yet a person and equally does not yet have a right to life, unlike an infant, it is easy to avoid the assumption that those who are pro-choice are automatically in favour of infanticide. According to Collins Dictionary; ‘Infanticide is the crime of killing a young child’ or ‘new- born infants’. 1 The same dictionary characterises an abortion as ‘an operation or other procedure to terminate pregnancy before the fetus is viable’. 2 It would therefore appear illogical to explain abortion in terms of infanticide as both describe very different procedures, one referring to life within the womb and the other, outside. This essay will seek to prove that it is indeed possible to offer a defence of abortion that doesn’t make infanticide morally permissible. Though it will recognise that the arguments in favour of abortion are more than capable of justifying this type of practise, it is certainly possible to show that this is not always the case.
Despite Michael Tooley’s attempts to offer justification for infanticide, which we will explore later on, his overall argument for the defence of abortion is that a fetus does not have a right 1 Collins Dictionary, Definition of ‘infanticide’ 2 Ibid, Definition of ‘abortion’
to life. He concludes this by establishing that a fetus does not qualify as a person and therefore it cannot be immoral to prevent carrying the unborn baby to term. He writes, ‘An organism possesses a serious right to life only if it possesses the concept of a self as a continuing subject of experiences and other mental states, and believes that it is itself such a continuing entity.’ 3 So while the idea that a fetus continues to develop genetically in a human sense may lend a defence to those who oppose abortions, the organisms’ inability to grasp the concept of a self or what Mary Anne Warren would describe as ‘sentience’ 4 , ultimately means we cannot treat nor identify it as a human or person. Tooley acknowledges Judith Jarvis Thomson’s claim that “Most opposition to abortion relies on the premise that the fetus is a human being, a person, from the moment of conception.” 5 Once this premise has been falsified, by looking at the properties needed in order to be a human being, such as ‘sentience’, ‘self-awareness’, ‘moral agency’ 6 and so on, it would be increasingly difficult to claim that a defence of abortion must be explained in terms of infanticide, when the latter solely involves the killing of a (young) person. Thomson upholds the view that a fetus cannot be a person from conception with the following analogy, ‘a newly fertilized ovum, a newly implanted clump of cells, is no more a person than an acorn is an oak tree.’ 7 This comparison seeks to support the distinction between the actuality of something, being an acorn, zygote or embryo and the potentiality to become something like a fully flourished tree or person. We mustn’t confuse the stages of development as being one and the same but rather separate and distinct. Therefore, it appears absurd to claim that the aborting of a fetus is morally 3 Michael Tooley : M. Tooley, 'Abortion and Infanticide', 1972) page 44 Philosophy and Public Affairs , Vol. 2, No. 1 (Autumn
4 Warren, Anne, Mary. 'On the Moral and Legal Status of AborPractice: An Anthology (Oxford: Blackwell, 4th edition 2014) page 136 tion', reprinted in LaFollette (ed.), Ethics in
5 Tooley, 'Abortion and Infanticide' page 41 6 Warren, 'On the Moral and Legal Status of Abortion' page 136 7 Judith Jarvis Thomson, 'A Defence of Abortion', in HBlackwell, 2nd edition 2002 or 3rd edition 2007) page 36. LaFollette (ed.), Ethics in Practice: An Anthology (Oxford:
other sentient human beings who have already been born, but who currently lack some of these other mental capabilities. These human beings, despite their current disabilities, are persons and members of the moral community.’ 11
To conclude, it is evident that the defences of abortion can make infanticide morally permissible. Even when we argue that a fetus is not yet a person it is easy to extend this to infants, at which point infanticide can be regarded as acceptable. However, this essay has successfully proved that defending abortion does not always result in this outcome and that the characteristics used to distinguish a fetus from a person must not be extended to new born infants in the same way, despite their lack of particular mental capabilities.
BIBLIOGRAPHY: Collins Dictionary, ‘Definition of Abortion’ Collins Dictionary, ‘Definition of Infanticide’ Thomson, Jarvis, Judith. 'A Defence of Abortion', in H. LaFollette (ed.), Ethics in Practice: An Anthology (Oxford: Blackwell, 2nd edition 2002 or 3rd edition 2007) Tooley, Michael. 'Abortion and Infanticide', Philosophy and Public Affairs, Vol. 2, No. 1 (Autumn 1972) pp. 37-65. Warren, Anne, Mary. 'On the Moral and Legal Status of Abortion', reprinted in LaFollette (ed.), Ethics in Practice: An Anthology (Oxford: Blackwell, 4th edition 2014)
11 Warren, 'On the Moral and Legal Status of Abortion' page 137
Philosophy - Abortion Essay
Module: Equity and Trusts (LW202-5-SP-CO)
University: University of Essex
