- Information
- AI Chat
Criminal Law Case list
Criminal Law (LAW1003)
University of Exeter
Recommended for you
Preview text
Violence
Woollin [1999] AC 82 D lost temper and threw 3-month son onto a hard surface fracturing its skull and died Court of Appeal lowered charge to manslaughter Trial judge directed the jury to convict if they were satisfied the defendant must have realised that if he threw the child he would cause serious injury – intention to harm – convict of murder The trial judge was incorrect to use the term substantial risk in place of virtual certainty - blurred the lines between intention and recklessness
Gnango [2011] UKSC 59 Bandana man and D had a street fight with guns, Bandanna shot D first and D returned fire. Bandana man killed a passer-by and could not be found Question: could Gnango have caused the death of the passer by? Held: it was foreseeable that the passer-by might be hit and Gnango was an accessory to the murder committed by Bandana man – Joint Enterprise Joint Enterprise: 1. Where 2 or more people join in committing a single crime 2. Where d2 aids and abets d1 to commit a single crime (providing with weapon) 3. Where d1 and d2 participate together in one crime and in the course of it d commits a second crime which d2 has foreseen he might commit Doctrine of transferred malice Policy led decision – Lord Brown said “the general public would be appalled if in those circumstances the law attached liability for the death only to the gunman who actually fired the fatal shot”
Grant [2014] EWCA Crim 143 The D gang chased a member of a rival gang intending to kill him. During the chase two passers-by were shot (5-year-old was paralysed and the other was shot in the head) The Ds were convicted of attempted murder and two outs of causing GBH with the intent to cause GBH Question: Could the D’s be charged with two separate offences for the same crime? Held: Yes – GBH murder required subtly different mens rea to attempted murder They were all responsible for the crimes committed by everyone in the group
G [2004] 1 AC 1034 Two Ds (11 and 12) set fire to newspapers then left the to burn out near a bin which was next to a supermarket The newspapers did not burn out but set fire to the bin the bin fire spread to the supermarket, causing £1 million in damage
Question: Were the two boys guilty of recklessly causing criminal damage? No – Lord Bingham ruled that recklessness required a subjective test whereby there must be a risk which the defendant is aware of and that the risk must not be reasonable to take. In this case the Ds were unaware of the risk and therefore were not reckless. He used the ‘moral blameworthiness’ principle whereby stupidity was not enough for a conviction
Cheshire [1991] 3 All ER 670 D shot a man in the stomach and thigh. The man was taken to hospital where he was operated on and developed breathing difficulties, the hospital gave him a tracheotomy. Weeks later when his wounds were healing he continued the have breathing problems and died from complication arising from the tracheotomy Question: could D have caused the death even though the hospital were negligent? Yes – at the time of death the shooting was still a more than minimal cause of death. For an act to be supervening (eliminating the shooting altogether as a cause of death) a jury must be satisfied that the original cause was made insignificant by the supervening event
Warburton [2006] EWCA Crim 627 D verbally abused his wife for many years and his wife committed suicide as a result of this abuse Question: Did the defendant cause his wife’s death? No – Whilst mental harm (recognised medical condition) can be classed as harm, mere emotions are not enough to qualify The Ds wife did not commit suicide as an immediate and reasonable response to the verbal abuse but acted voluntarily
Kennedy [2007] UKHL 38 Kennedy supplied class A drugs to V, V voluntarily self-administer the drugs and died as a result Question: did Kennedy cause the death of the victim by way of unlawful act of manslaughter No – the supply of drugs was an unlawful act it had not caused death The death was caused by the voluntary act of the victim, who it is assumed acted under free will to help him sleep The chain of causation was broken
Michael (1840) 9 C&P 356 M was a wet nurse for a wealthy family but was v poor herself. She purchased laudanum and put it in a baby bottle with the intention of feeding it to her child. She told another woman to feed the bottle to the baby saying that it would help with its sickness but the
A 15-year-old boy took some acid from a lesson and placed in it the hand drier in the boy’s toilets. The acid went in a boy’s face causing permanent scars The d knew that he had created a dangerous situation and acted recklessly and therefore was guilty of assault
Haystead v Chief Constable of Derbyshire [2000] 3 All ER 890 A baby’s mother was punched by police resulting in the baby being dropped. The baby was said to have been battered by the police officer Indirect force – battery did not require the direct infliction of violence and that Hs act had been comparable to using a weapon to cause the child the fall
Santana Bermudez [2003] All ER (D) 168 (Nov) D injured a police officer by allowing her to search him knowing he had needles in his pocket which stabbed her Held: where someone created a danger and thereby exposed another to a reasonably foreseeable risk of injury there was an evidential basis for the actus reas of an assault occasioning ABH
Roberts [1972] Crim LR 27 D attempted to engage in sexual activity with V who refused and then D sped up in the care. She jumped out of the moving car to escape him and suffered injuries D said he did not intend or foresee a risk of her suffering ABH from his actions There is no need to establish an intention or recklessness, it is sufficient to establish that the D had intention or was reckless as to the assault The Vs actions were a natural result of Ds actions – does not matter whether D could foresee the result – only where the Vs actions were so daft that no reasonable man could have expected it would there be a break in the chain of causation
Ireland [1998] AC 147 D made a series of silent calls over 3 months to 3 different women He appealed contending that silence cannot amount to an assault and that psychiatric injury is not bodily harm Lord Steyn – “it is assault in the form of an act causing the victim to fear an immediate application of force to her”
Logdon [1976] Crim LR 121 D pointed an imitation gun at a women and she was terrified. The D then told her it wasn’t real Held: an assault had been committed as the victim had apprehended immediate unlawful personal violence and the D was reckless as to whether she would apprehend such violence
Collins v Wilcock [1984] 3 All ER 374, 378 A police women took hold of a woman’s arm to stop her from walking off when she was questioning her. The woman scratched the police woman and was charged with assaulting a police officer Held: The police woman’s actions amounted to battery and the Ds action was in self defence No consent was given to the grabbing of the arm – acting outside of the scope of duty as a police officer
Thomas (1985) 81 Cr App R 331, 334 A school caretaker assaulted a 12-year-old after taking hold of the hem of her skirt Ruled that touching someone’s clothes whilst they are wearing them is equivalent to touching him
Parmenter [1991] 4 All ER 698 The D was heavy handed with his baby who suffered injuries to his legs and forearms. The D as no use to handling young babies and did not know his actions would result in injury Held: judge directed the jury that they were to convict I the defendant should have foreseen that his handling of the child would result in some harm
Eisenhower [1984] QB 331 D shot an airgun at a group of people causing bruising and a blood vessel below the skin burst A conviction under section 20 wounding required evidence of a break in the skin – scratch is insufficient
M’Loughlin (1838) 173 ER 651 Wound – necessary to separate the whole skin
Jones [1987] Crim LR 123 School boys convicted of inflicting GBH on fellow school mates having thrown them into the air with the intention of catching them. They dropped them resulting in serious injury Consent to rough and undisciplined horseplay is a defence and eve n if there was no actual consent if the appellants had a genuine belief in consent they should be allowed the defence
Re F [1990] 2 AC 1, 72
The D repeatedly hit the victim with a chair in a pub and the V died as a result. The defendant did not mean to kill the victim Issue: could the D be convicted of murder? Held: Yes – mens rea can of murder can be satisfied either by an intent to cause death or cause GBH
White [1910] 2 KB 124 White added poison to a drink intending to kill his mother. After drinking some the mother died in her sleep on a heart attack, unconnected to the poison Issue: did W cause the death of his mother Held: no – factual causation and legal causation are both required for a D to be said to have caused the death Recognition of a ‘but for’ test of factual causation - Would the result have occurred but for the actions of the defendants – if the answer is yes the D is not guilty Irrespective of the poison his mother would have still died Today he could still be convicted of attempted murder
Gibbins v Proctor (1918) 13 Cr App R 134 – Gross Negligence Manslaughter – duty A mother and father starved their child Issue: was this murder? Yes – murder can be caused by an omission if a duty is imposed on the defendant – both under a duty to protect their child
Adams [1957] Crim LR 365 Allows a doctor to hasten death (as a second intention) using painkillers Doctor was charged with murder by easing the passing of elderly patients by giving drugs calculated to hasten their deaths Held: he is entitled to do all that is proper to relieve pain even if the measures he takes make incidentally shorten life
Airedale NHS Trust V Bland [1993] AC 789 Doctors sought a declaration that it was acceptable to turn off the life support machine which had held a patient in a vegetative state for more than 2 years Issue: could a declaration be obtained? Held: Yes – where a person is unable to give or withhold their own consent doctors are entitled to decide what is in the patient’s best interests. It may be in the patient’s best interests to discontinue treatment
Inglis [2010] EWCA Crim 2637 The Appellant appealed against her conviction for murdering her son Thomas would had suffered serious head injuries when he had fallen out of an ambulance. He had undergone lifesaving surgery which removed part of his skull resulting in severe facial disfigurement He was in a vegetative state but the doctors were hopeful he would make a full recovery The appellant was convinced his vegatitive state was permanent, became obsessive and believed he was in pain and wanted to end his suffering and injected him with a lethal dose of heroin with intention to kill Held: Conviction was upheld Lord Chief justice – “mercy killing is murder’
Clinton [2012] EWCA Crim 2 – Loss of control In a meeting to tell their child that they were getting divorced a wife told her depressed, intoxicated husband in graphic detail about her affair and taunted him about a suicide website. In response the husband killed his wife Issue: could he rely on loss of self-control Held: Yes – if sexual infidelity explains the context of the situation it should not be excluded from the jury The defence may be raised by the defendant or the judge and places the evidential burden on the defendant as to the first 2 requirements –loss of self-control, and a qualifying trigger Replaced the common law defence of provocation
Ashmelash [2013] EWCA Crim 157 – loss of control and alcohol The D was intoxicated when he murdered the victim Issue: could his intoxication be taken into account upon pleading the defence of loss of control Held: No – although drunkenness does not deprive a d from the defence of loss of self- control a jury is to ignore it when applying the reasonableness test set out as the 3rd element to the defence in section 54 of the Coroners and justice Act 2009
Dawes [2013] EWCA Crim 322 Dawes found his wife asleep with another man and woke the man up with violence. Following the man’s retaliation Dawes stabbed the man fatally in the neck. Self-defence was rejected by the jury. The trial judge rejected loss of self-control as the defendant had incited the qualifying trigger Issue: could the D rely on the defence of loss of self-control?
Held: guilty of manslaughter – unlawful act manslaughter – unlawful act was endangering road users contrary to the Road Traffic Act 1988 – obvious to any reasonable person that what she did would be dangerous
Lowe [1973] QB 702 Two parents neglected their child who later died as a result Issue: could the parents have committed unlawful act manslaughter? Held – no – unlawful act manslaughter requires a positive act and not an omission There seems to be little logical basis for this conclusion
Church [1966] 1 QB 59 The D believed that he had killed the victim through his assault who ‘disposed’ of the body in a river where the v died of drowning Issue – did the D cause the death of the v Held – Yes – on the application of unlawful act manslaughter to the facts there was no issue with the application of the coincidence doctrine Test for dangerous in unlawful manslaughter is on objective assessment of whether the defendants act might cause some harm
Newbury [1977] AC 500 Two boys through a paving stone off a bridge onto a train and killed a guard on the train Issue – were the boys guilty of unlawful act manslaughter? Yes – dangerous test in unlawful act manslaughter comes from church – the act must be capable of causing some harm
Adamako [1995] 1 AC 171 The D who was a doctor failed to notice a respiratory tube had become disconnected during an operation – disconnection was obvious and the patient died Issue – did his satisfy the requirement for an offence of gross negligence manslaughter Held: yes – requires a duty of care to be breached
Evans [2009] 1 WLR 1999 Evans gave her sister some heroin which was then self-administer. When overdosing the d didn’t call 999 Issue: was this gross negligence manslaughter? Yes – duty to take care of the victim was present and was breached by omission It is for the judge to decide whether there is a duty of care and what the duty is
For the jury to decide whether the duty has been breached and whether the breach is serious enough to warrant a crime
Wacker [2002] EWCA Crim 1944 A lorry driver carrying 60 illegal immigrants into the UK closed a vent whilst passing border control. 58 died Issue: had he committed gross negligence manslaughter Held: yes – a duty could be imposed not just on the basis of tort but also on the grounds of public policy and this duty was breached dangerously and resulted in death
Lidar (1999) (CA) The D drive off whilst the victim was having a conversation with him and vs head still part way in the car Issue: could the d be convicted of manslaughter? Held: yes – reckless manslaughter. This is the only know reckless manslaughter conviction were the probability of serious harm or death was present and that risk was assessed and then taken by the defendant
Extended liability
Taylor (1859) 175 ER 831 – attempt and withdrawal Facts: d approached a stack of corn with the intention of setting fire to it and lighted a match for that purpose but abondoned his plan on finding that he was being watched Held: Guilty of attempt – once steps taken towards the commission of an offence are sufficiently far advances to amount to an attempt it can make no difference whether the failure to complete the crime is due to a voluntary withdrawal by the defendant, the intervention of the police or any other reason
Jones [1990] 3 All ER 886 – Attempts – more than preparatory – embarking on the full crime A attempted to murder V. He bought a shotgun, and test fired it. He later claimed into the back of Vs car and told him to drive to a secluded area. He pointed the gun at V, the safely catch was on. V grabbed the gun and threw it out the window and escaped. Guilty of attempted murder Held – D must come close to committing the full offence but there must be some acts left to person before the substantive offence is committed.
Kelly [1992] Crim LR 181 – attempted rape
Held – to establish a conspiracy to murder it must be proved that the course of conduct agreed upon must necessarily have amounted to or involved the murder of some person
Saik [2006] UKHL 18 Charged were brought against Mr Saik who operated a bureau de change in London. He pleaded guilty to the charge of conspiracy to launder money on the basis that he did not know that the funds he converted into foreign currency on a number of accassions were the proceeds of crime, but that he suspected they were such Held – criminal provenance of the property is a fact necessary for the commission of the offence and as such a section 1 of the Criminal Law Act 1997. Offence of conspiracy is committed at the time of the agreement without substantive criminal activities taking place
Giannetto [1997] 1 Cr App Rep 1 Held - A murder conviction was correct on a joint charge where the defendant was found to have encouraged and arranged it. The jury do not have to be sure which D in fact killed provided they are sure both were there pursuant to a joint enterprise to kill or cause GBH
Jogee [2016] UKSC 8 Reversed previous case law on joint enterprise Jogee shouted encouraged out of the window and Hirsi stabbed and killed V Held – Did the D assist or encourage the commission of the crime? In this assistance or encouragement id the D act with the requisite mental element of that offence
Johnson v Youden [1950] 1 KB 544 The 2 Ds were charged with aiding and abetting a builder in selling a house at a price which was over the legal limit. The D argued that they did not know that the builder was charging over the legal limit so they should not be held liable. Prosecutor argued that they did not need the mens rea to be convicted The true test for accessorial liability is knowledge of the essential matter of that offence or that type of offence and acts which demonstrate an intention to assist or encourage that offence or that type of offence
Bainbridge [1960] 1 QB 129 The D had supplied some cutting equipment which was subsequently used to break into a bank. He claimed that he had though the equipment might be used for some illegal purpose but he didn’t know it was going to be used to break into a bank. Held – CofA held that it was essential to prove that D knew the type of crime that was going to be committed. It was not necessary to show knowledge of the particular date and premises concerned If the D gives assistance to the P knowing that the P intends to commit a crime, but being uncertain whether the P has crime X or crime Z in mind, the D will be liable as a secondary party to whichever of those crimes the principle in fact commits
Maxwell [1978] 1 WLR 1350 A man guided terrorists to a public house which they bombed. He did not know that the terrorists had brought explosives not did he know the exact nature of their plan. He did know that they were engaged in a terrorist activity and the use of explosives was probable Held – an aider or abettor may be guilty even if he did not know the exact nature of the crime committed by the P provided that he did know that the latter intended to commit a crime of a similar kind
Tyrrell [1894] 1 QB 710 The court considered whether a girl between the ages of 13 and 16 could be convicted of aiding and abetting a male who had had unlawful sexual intercourse with her Held – a person for whose protection an offence has been created cannot be convicted of aiding and abetting a person who commits the offence against her.
Gnango [2011] UKSC 59 B and G had a street fight with guns. B fired first and G returned fire. Bs next shot killed a passer- by. B could not be found Issue – did G cause the death of the passer-by? Held – G was an accessory to the murder.
Rook [1993] 2 All ER 955 Rook was one of a gang of 3 men who met and agreed on the details of a plan to kill the wife of MA for £20,000. Rook did not turn up the next day and the killing was carried out by his 2 associates. His defence was that he never intended for the woman to be killed. Thought if he was absent then the other 2 wouldn’t carry out
Whitefield (1984) 79 Cr App R 36 The 2 accused agreed to break into a flat but before entry was achieved W said he withdrew. The other burgled the flat with another. Held – the appeal was allowed – the judge was wrong to tell the jury that communication of his withdrawal to a co-accused was insufficient
O’Flaherty [2004] EWCA Crim 526 It is for the jury to decide the question as to what the D had joined up to in a joint enterprise case by considering the knowledge and actions of those involved. The Jury would have to be sure before the D was convicted that the D had participated in the joint enterprise foreseeing that in the course of that joint enterprise the person who killed might use force with intent to kill or cause really serious bodily harm
Held: As long as D had the mens rea of murder at the time of drinking the whisky, and did not positively discard it, he could properly be convicted. Lord Denning said defence not available to either specific or basic intent, if drink or drugs taken to fortify courage
Hardie [1985] 1 WLR 64 – Voluntary taking (non-dangerous) drugs – rules of voluntary intoxication apply throughout Facts: D started a fire in a friends flat after taking Valium not prescribed for him. Not guilty. Held: Caldwell distinguished because he did not have the mens rea, and considered that while intoxication cannot usually be pleased as a defence to offences of recklessness, the rule will not generally apply to drugs.
Quick [1973] QB 910 – Automatism – an external factor Facts: D a nurse assaulted a patient, he was a diabetic, had taken insulin and not eaten sufficient food. He drank whisky and rum and could not remember the assault. He pleaded automatism. Not guilty. Held: D was suffering from automatism, which is a mental abnormality caused by an external factor. He was not suffering from insanity.
Bailey [1983] 2 All ER 503 – automatism – self-induced – available for specific or basic intent in some circumstances Facts: D seriously injured a rival I love with an iron bar. D a diabetic, visited his ex-girlfriend and her new partner. He took insulin and had nothing to eat. He assaulted the partner of his ex- girlfriend. He said he hit him to teach him a lesson. D claimed he acted in a state of automatism caused by hypoglycaemia. He did not complicate the issue with alcohol or drugs. Guilty. Held: Automatism, even if self induces could provide a defence to a crime of basic intent (unless caused by intoxication). What must be considered is whether D in view of his knowledge of the likely result of his actions, was sufficiently reckless. It was not necessarily reckless to fail to take food after a dose of insulin.
Coley [2013] EWCA Crim 223 Facts: D was seriously depressed and developing schizophrenia. Set fire to own property but didn’t see risk of fire spreading and endangering his neighbours. Charged for endangering life. Held: it wasn’t good enough to say that he would normally see the risk if he had been normal and well.
Bingham [1991] Crim LR 433 – Automatism distinguished from insanity Facts: D a diabetic was charged with theft of a coke can and sandwiches worth £1 and at the time he had £90 in his pocket. He paid for one can of coke. He made no comment to questions. He was suffering from automatism by the way of hypoglycaemia and was unaware of his actions. The judge refused to leave that defence to the jury,
Held: Allowing the appeal. Hyperglycaemia and hypoglycaemia should be distinguished.
Sullivan [1984] AC 156 – Epilepsy is insanity, not automatism Facts: D kicked neighbour in the head and body while having elliptic fit Held: Epilepsy is insanity (not automatism) it effects the mind, not an external cause such as drugs or alcohol – guilty.
M’Naghten (1873) 8 ER 718 Facts: M’Naghten attempted to kill the PM but killed the PMs secretary instead. He was suffering from insane delusions at the time of the killing. The House of Lords formulated the M’Naghten rules which apply in determining whether a person should escape criminal liability on the grounds of being insane. Held: Jurors ought to be told that every man is presumed to be sane and to possess a sufficient degree of reason to be responsible for his crimes until the contrary be proved to their satisfaction. It must be proved that at the time of committing the acts the party accused was labouring under such a defect of reason, from disease of the mind, as not to know the nature and quality of the act he was doing or as to not know what he was doing was wrong.
Jones [2006] UKHL 16 Facts: Broke into army base and caused damage to fuel tankers and bomb trailers. Each d sought to raise by way of defence of their various criminal actions, the fact that they were attempting to prevent the commission by the government of the crime of waging an aggressive war in Iraq, and that their acts were therefore justified in law Held: The law on aggression was not part of domestic law – necessity is a defence to a domestic offence
Williams [1987] 3 All ER 411 Facts: The D saw a youth being dragged along the street by the victim while the youth shouted for help. The victim had seen the youth mug a lady and had grabbed the youth. The D intervened believing that the young boy was being assaulted. The victim claimed to be a policeman which was a lie and could not produce a warrant card when asked. A fight followed. At the trial the jury were told that mistake can only be a defence if the mistake was reasonable – guilty Held: A mistake of fact can be a successful defence regardless of whether the belief is reasonable or not
Ashley v Chief Constable of Sussex [2008] UKHL 25 Facts: Ashley was shot dead while in bed during an armed police raid on his house. The police admitted negligence in the shooting. The son and father of the deceased brought claims for negligence, assault and battery. Whether the requirement for self-defence should be the same in tort law as they are in criminal law. Whether the assault and battery claimed could proceed to trial on their own
Held: appeal was dismissed. Where the D was the aggressor or deliberately provokes the victim into punching him, there is no guaranteed right to rely on self-defence. Self-defence may arise in the case of an original aggressor but only where violence offered by the victim was so out of proportion to what the original aggressor did that in effect the roles were reversed.
Clegg [1995] 1 AC 482 Facts: D was a soldier in NI, he was manning a vehicle check point, a car approached, it accelerated with its head lights on full beam. All soldiers opened fire at the car. They fired 3 shots as the car was approaching and 1 shot as the car was driving away. The final shot was the fatal, hitting a passenger. The car contained young joy riders not terrorists. The D was convicted of murder and appealed. Appeal was rejected because he fired the last shot after the danger had past and used excessive force in the circumstances. Held: Appeal was dismissed. The House of Lords declined to extend the defence available to allow those who use excessive force which results in death to have manslaughter convictions substituted for a murder conviction because they are a police officer/soldier and their intention was to protect the public.
Hasan [2005] UKHL 22 – Duress not available for gang members – objective test Facts: D was involved with prostitutes. S was a drug dealer whom D thought to have committed 3 murders. D took a prostitute to the house but the occupant refused her, but on that visit D became aware of a safe in the house. D was convicted of burglary when he returned to the house armed with a knife and attempted to steal the safe. D claimed that he acted under duress exerted by S so he had no chance to escape or opportunity to go to the police. He was sentenced to 9 years in prison. Held: The D may not rely on duress to which he has voluntarily laid himself open. In holding that there must be foresight of coercion to commit crimes of the kind which the D is charged. D loses the benefit of a defence based on duress if he ought reasonably to have foreseen the risk of coercion. A person voluntarily associating with known criminal ought reasonably to have foreseen the risk of future coercion. The policy of the law must be to discourage association with known criminal and it should be slow to excuse the criminal conduct of those who do so.
Howe [1987] AC 417 – Duress not available in murder or attempt Facts: D acting under duress took part with others in two separate murders and on a third occasion the intended victim escaped. Held: Using the 1966 Practice Statement to depart from the decision in Lynch. Duress is not available as a defence to murder either to a principal or accessory. Morals, law and policy should deny a man the right to take an innocent life even at the price of his own.
Gotts [1992] 2 AC 412 – duress not available in murder or attempted murder D aged 17 caused serious injuries when he stabbed his mother with intent to kill her. He alleged that his father told him to do so and threatened to kill him if he did not carry out his wishes. Held: Following the decision in R v Howe as duress is no defence to murder it would be illogical to apply this defence to attempted murder – guilty.
Abdul-Hussain [1999] Crim LR 570 – Duress – escape cases Facts: D’s were Shia Muslims living in Sudan who feared being sent back to Iraq and certain execution. They hijacked a plane with plastic knives and imitation hand grenades, forced it to fly to Britain where they surrender after 8 hours. Held: the defence of duress by threat or circumstances was available to all offences other than murder, attempted murder or treason. The imminent peril of death or serious injury to the D or his dependant had to operate in the mind of the D at the time he committed the act so as to overbear his will as in Martin 1989. Not guilty.
Sharp [1987] QB 853 – Duress not available to gang members Facts: D joined a gang who carried out a series of armed robberies at post offices. In the last on these robberies the post master was shot and killed by X. Held: The defence of duress was not available to a person who voluntarily and with knowledges of its nature joined a criminal organisation or gang which he knew might bring pressure on him to commit an offence and was an active member when he was put under such pressure.
Bowen [1996] 4 All ER 837 – Duress – level of timidity of D – characteristics that can be ascribed to D Facts: D had been threatened that his home would be petrol bombed if he did not provide various electrical goods. Held: It was not necessary for the jury to take into account Ds low intelligence (short of mental impairment) when considering the effect of the threats on a reasonable person. Stuart-Smith LJ the principles are: 1. D's vulnerability or timidity are not to be ascribed to the reasonable person for the purposes of the objective test. 2. D may be in a category of persons that the jury might think were less able than others to resist threats: for example, young people, possibly women, pregnant women afraid for their unborn child, persons with physical disabilities inhibiting their self-protection, or persons with a recognised psychiatric disorder supported by medical evidence. 3. Characteristics relevant in provocation because they related to the nature of the provocation (for example, D's homosexuality) would not necessarily be relevant in duress, and characteristics due to self-abuse (such as drunkenness) can never be relevant.
Rodger and Rose [1998] 1 Cr App R 143 – general defences – duress of circumstances – necessity – circumstances must be external Facts: D’s claim that they had been forced to esape from prison because otherwise they would have been driven to commit suicide as a result of the extreme depression they were suffering. Held: For the defence to apply, the circumstances had to be external to the actual offender. Guilty.
Criminal Law Case list
Module: Criminal Law (LAW1003)
University: University of Exeter
This is a preview
Access to all documents
Get Unlimited Downloads
Improve your grades
