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South Sea stock bubble Final Essay 2.0
History of Economic Thought (BEE1032)
University of Exeter
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Was the political climate of 18th century Britain to blame for allowing the South Sea stock bubble to occur and how wide reaching were the consequences of this affair? (6500)
The actions of the South Sea Company between the years 1711-1720 precipitated a stock market crash in the summer of 1720, the infamous South Sea Bubble. It was the first major financial crash of the early modern period and came about largely as a result of the Company’s scheme to repossess government debt. Due to the repossessing scheme being so convoluted and the clandestine actions of the Company there is still debate to be had as to the root causes of this unique affair. The Historiographical debate around the subject is outlined effectively by the early modern lecturer Natasha Glaisyer 1. She effectively splits the debate into two main categories. The first is a more Whiggish view of the South Sea Company’s scheme and the crash, that it was an age defining event and held a lofty status, at least in terms of fiscal policy and credit. The opposing view is a more revisionist reading of the events, claiming that there was a multitude of factors contributing to the events which transpired and that the historical significance of the South Sea Company is a little overinflated. This second interpretation also tends to focus on specific fields of enquiry within the source material, such as a purely financial interpretation.
The Whiggish interpretation of the South Sea Company’s actions throughout the 1710s is one focusing on the significant individuals, their actions and grand narratives. Carswell, who spent much of his career as a civil servant, provides an in depth description of events, leading up to the South Sea Company’s schemes implementation and the political and economic fallout in the immediate aftermath. Much of Carswell’s volume on The South Sea Company centres around the colourful lives of the politicians and financiers at least in the latter sections 2. The main reason given by Carswell for what transpired focuses on the changes resulting from the commercial revolution of credit access taking place and how that led to a changing relationship between government and business 3. He goes onto characterise the effects of the Bubble as being profound, but not necessarily in a financial sense, saying political philosophy was irrevocably changed in the aftermath 4. This view is taken further by Professor John Brewer who describes the large number of fixed term annuities issued by the government, in other words, the governments increasing reliance on debt as being a major 1 Natasha Glaisyer, The Culture of Commerce in England 1660-1720 (Woodbridge 2006), p. 2 Janet Weston, ‘The South Sea Bubble by John Carswell’, The Journal of Finance 16 (1961), 4463
4 John Carswell, The South Sea Bubble, revised edition 1993 (Stroud 1960), p. Carswell (1960), p.
factor in combination with the competitive market for control of said debt 5. According to Brewer’s analysis, the short term shock followed by a painful reconstruction of public finance helped to define the financial policy for the next century 6. Brewers analysis of the South Sea Bubble prompting financial upheaval and reform is supported by the earlier writings of Peter George Muir Dickson 7. But Dickson places the majority of responsibility for the bubble on the governments partially unjustified belief in their own bravura 8. The opposing view of the revisionists is the more recent revision of not only the impetus for the actions of the South Sea Company but also the extent to which the crash really permeates society. Professor of economic history Julian Hoppit and the legal historian Ron Harris are the two most vocal supporters of this revisionist narrative. Hoppit’s analysis of events is that the South Sea Bubble was indicative of a wider trend of financial mismanagement and credit abuse leading to irrational bubbles throughout England and Europe 9. He also attributes the ever growing power of the company the result of complacency in parliament towards regulation of joint stock companies, not outright corruption as Carswell has suggested 10. Harris attributes the causes of the bubble to no factor in particular, citing the speculators, the small bubbles, and the joint-stock system as the roots of the disaster 11. These are simply the most significant voices in the debate, and throughout the essay I will endeavour to introduce more historians analysis of the question.
The primary sources I will be using to answer the specified question are all dated from between 1710 and 1721. A letter from John Drummond to Robert Harley provides useful context as to the political environment around the formation of the company 12. When placed in the historiographical debate previously discussed it lends credence to the Harris analysis, however, can also be applied to the Carswell thesis of changing financial landscapes. The act
5 John Brewer, The Sinews of Power: war, money and the English state 1688- (Cambridge 1989), p 6
7 Brewer (1989), p. Peter George Muir Dickson, the financial revolution in England: a study in the development of public credit 1688-1756 8 (New York 1967), p.
9 Dickson (1967), p. 10 Julian Hoppit, A land of liberty: England 1689-1727 (New York 2000), p. Julian Hoppit, ‘The Myths of the South Sea Bubble’, Transactions of the Royal Historical Society 11 12 (2002), Ron Harris, ‘The Bubble Act: Its Passage and Its Effects on Business Organization’, The Journal of Economic History, vol 12 54 (1994), 611 John Drummond, “letter to Robert Harley, 22 August 1710”, the manuscripts of his grace the Duke of Portland, Vol 4, (Welbeck Abbey 1891), 572-
how it relates to the question it is appropriate to discuss the man who produced it. John Drummond, a merchant banker based in Amsterdam would become a key advisor and confidant to Robert Harley as the Tory administration was constructed 20. Given this level of rapport, it can be concluded that the statements made by the source are the truthful thoughts of Drummond. The letter itself is a snapshot of the political and financial situation Robert Harley would have to contend with. Drummond makes clear he holds the previous leader of the government, Lord Godolphin, in poor repute when exclaiming ‘if the bank will undertake everything, they ought to have it’ when describing the poor exchange imposed on merchants. He goes on, imploring Harley to ‘keep Furnese doing something, that he may not do mischief’. this is referring to Sir Henry Furnese who was a member of parliament and director of the Bank of England who, along with others in the Whig controlled bank of England refused the new administration credit to fund its various military obligations in Europe 21. At this point, Britain was in the midst of the war of the Spanish succession and subsequently forcing itself into debt in order to maintain its military presence in Europe 22. The cost of the Duke of Marlborough’s army in the low countries totalled £1,500, annually, however even this figure was small in comparison to the navy debt of £6,000,000 23. The irredeemable fixed term annuities issued by the government during this conflict would drive up the annual obligations of the government to its creditors, and would ultimately prove a significant motivator for reducing debt through the South Sea Company’s scheme 24.
The main deficiencies of this source come from the time that it was written and the person who was writing it. As this letter was written August 1710 this is before the Tory government had held its first session, it had yet to formulate plans for the South Sea Company and would first attempt to raise capital through the lotteries, which is suggested by Drummond 25. The 1711 lottery run by future South Sea director john blunt would supply the government with an immediate cash injection, however, due to the prizes being paid in instalments it only increased the annuity burden on parliamentary finances 26. yet there is no direct connection of this letter to the company itself or the bubble that would arise almost 20 Romney Sedgwick, The History of Parliament: The House of Commons 1715-1754, volume 1, (London 1970), p 21
22 Hoppit (2000), p. 23 Brewer (1989), p. 24 Carswell (1960), p. 25 Brewer (1989), p. 26 Carswell (1960), p. 43 Carswell (1960), p.
exactly ten years after the sources creation. While the source does allude to the government finances being in a sorry state, it does not give any idea as to the extent of the problem. At this time unfunded government debt amounted to around £9,000,000 27. However, perhaps it is unfair to assume Drummond would have any knowledge to this effect, as it took a thorough investigation by Harley to determine how dire the government finances were. Being a letter too means it is inherently selective in its scope, the viewpoint of John Drummond, removed from England at the time provides obvious limitations. One aspect of this source to note is that the Duke of Portland, who’s collection this letter is preserved in, converted £15, worth of annuities into South Sea stock 28. The letter can be applied to Hoppit’s argument that the South Sea Company was at its core a tory counter weight to a Whig dominated bank of England 29. This source, placed in the context of the Hoppit analysis, adds credence to the idea that political partisanship played a role in allowing the bubble to happen. John Carswell’s analysis of the causes of the South Sea bubble can also be used to question this source further. When Drummond is asking favours of Harley to mention him to Theodore Janssen, along with the suggestion he heed the advice of bankers and businessmen such as Theodore Janssen, it provides evidence of Carswell’s claim that business interests were beginning to have a more prominent relationship with government and policy 30. When engaged with sufficiently this source shows how the political environment of partisanship, along with the issuance of government bonds to pay for war were important factors in the creation and nature of The South Sea company.
The act enabling King George the first to become the governor of the South Sea Company is interesting to examine. created in 1718, the law appears to have been penned by Thomas Newcomb, a poet and clergyman on behalf of the king and parliament. Newcomb was a Whig leaning writer who would later create works on the ascendance of Robert Walpole 31. the source itself describes the king’s official relationship with the Company, and attempts to justify the legality of him holding this new position. It also provides some interesting loopholes that need to be scrutinised. The law begins with outlining the King’s entitlement of £10,000 of the company’s stock, as is required under the company’s charter in order to have a
27 Carswell (1960), p. 28 Carswell (1960), p. 29 Hoppit (2002), p. 30 Carswell (1960), p. 37 31 Tone Sundt Urstad, Sir Robert Walpole's Poets: the use of literature as pro-government propaganda, 1721-1742 (1999), p. 61
played in setting up the bubble. It begins to show us how men of little or no experience were being assigned to roles that were not suited to them. This is shown in the incompetence of the initial directors of the company, none of whom had any experience in South Sea trade which was supposedly a major part of the company’s revenue model 36. This is a stark example of how the company was extending its reach from public to royal finance, creating an ever larger network of powerful individuals who would want to see the price of stock rise. The source also forces us to question Hoppit’s argument that the company’s tory origins were key for causing the bubble as is demonstrated by the evidence provided that by this point the party who envisaged it were completely uninvolved. Furthermore, this source, when placed within the context of historian’s analysis of events, especially Carswell and Hoppit supports the utility of the content. taken together the law gives credence to the idea that politics, unchecked power and conflicting interests all played a role in allowing the South Sea stock to balloon how it did. It is a demonstration of a Whig administration that sought to take control of a company whose relationship with the government had been poisoned at this point 37. Nonetheless, at this point company stock had remained relatively stable since its initial issue, due to the limited amount of government debt that could be exchanged for stock. So comprehensively this source shows the Whigs tightening control over financial institution, by placing an inexperienced king at the head of what was the largest financial institution in Britain. This is clear evidence of an overabundance of credit 38 and overconfident political climate putting financial stability at risk.
The proposal for the taking on of public debts was first presented to parliament by the company on the 17th of January 1719. drafted by John fellows and Charles Foye, the sub and deputy governors of the South Sea Company it sought to build on the relative success and popularity of the first £9,000,000 of government debt the company had converted 39. Further expanding the scheme to encompass long term fixed annuities along with the leftover obligations from the 1711 lottery. This was something that Robert Harley could not have imagines when he set up the South Sea Company in 1711 and ultimately Aislabie was
36 Dale (2004), p. 37 Carswell (1960)pg 56 38 Garry Cox, “Was the Glorious Revolution a Constitutional Watershed?”, the journal of economic history, vol 72 (2012) p567-568 39 Arne Bialuschewski, ‘A True Account of the Design, and Advantages of the South-Sea Trade: Profits, Propaganda, and the Peace Preliminaries of 1711’, Huntington Library Quarterly 73 (2010), 275
committing plain blunder in accepting the proposals 40. The consolidation of so much debt into one company, drew anger from the other debt holders, The East India Company and The Bank of England. So how was such a radical law passed. Straight away the proposal specifies that its purpose is to reduce government payments on debt, presenting this as a service they are doing to the government. The company was somewhat correct in this, as under the proposals the exceptional sum of £31,000,000 in debt that the government was paying various rates on would be reduced to a uniform four percent, saving over £400, annually 41. What is noteworthy is that, John Blunt, formerly of the hollow sword blade company and now a director of the company had created nearly £1,000,000 of this debt through his handling of the 1711 lottery 42. Accepting the proposal would carry on the new Whig trend of financial reform, who in 1717 had already reduced yearly debt payments by thirteen percent 43. In order to cover this debt, the company in the second page expresses a desire to issue more stock under the scheme, which as has already been addressed was by this time their main source of income. One key aspect of this scheme, that would lead the company to inflate the value of their stock is addressed in the third page as the debt swap would be voluntary. This meant that speculation and market manipulation would have to be employed to convince people to make the trade 44. In closing, the source mentions that for the privilege of taking charge of this debt they will pay parliament the sum of £3,500,000 for doing so. Yet it must be considered that the final version of the proposal, passed more than a year later promised a payment of double that after a bidding war had occurred between the Company and the Bank of England as an attempt to halt the company’s ascendancy. What this source amounts to is a thinly veiled bribe affording the company the consent of parliament to issue more stock in order to stay afloat.
Understanding this source in relation to the question is paramount, as this was the event that ultimately sent the South Sea Stock ballooning in value. Once the law was passed in April 1720 the already rising stock would see a meteoric rise over four consecutive months 45. What meaning and significance do historians prescribe this source. Carswell sees it as the
40 Carswell (1960), p. 41 Carswell (1960), p. 42 Poitras (2000), p. 43 Brewer (1989), p. 124 44 Hoppit (2000), p. 45 Patrick Walsh, ‘The South Sea Bubble: A Parable for Our Own Time’, History Ireland 17, (2009), 7
contributed to the stock bubble. The source describes on the fourth page how the unfair monopolies granted to the South Sea Company could swallow up the Africa Company, creating a monopoly over practically all British trade in the Atlantic. This, from a company conducting its pitiful amount of trade purely on credit 53. On the fifth page, the source critiques the mishandling of the asiento slave contract granted to the company how this prevented them from conducting any sort of meaningful trade with the Spanish colonies. Richard Dale claims trade as being blighted from the outset, claiming that between 1713- 1718 the company was in a budget defecate due to this trade which came to an end in 1718 when war with Spain broke out again 54. This was because many of the trading privileges gained by the company were because of its use as a pawn in peace negotiations with Spain 1713 after the war of the Spanish succession 55. What this source more than any other does is provides insight of the contemporary objections to what the south sea company was doing. Not just in terms of debt but the way they were conducting trade. Detracting from this usefulness is that the source places too much importance on trade as part of the South sea company’s business model. All discourse around this issue agrees that it was inconsequential to the company’s income and a relatively small factor in the eventual ballooning stock price.
So how does this source and its focus on the South Sea Company’s trading activities help in answering the question. If placed in the context of Carswell we can see this as not only a critique of South Sea trade, but as representative of what pushed the company towards debt based income and subsequently financial ruin. The disagreements over trade between parliament and South Sea were what lead to the souring of the relationship, and a climate of exploitation of government emerging 56. The failing of trade would also lead the company to push through its proposal to take on government debt as a means of self-preservation, resulting to bribery and political manipulation to achieve this. With increasing obligations would come a need to issue more and more stock to provide income 57. All this resulted in laws such as The Bubble Act, directing ever more public finds to the Company to maintain this increasing reliance on stock 58. The source itself also seems to be an avocation for similar
53 Carswell (1960), p. 54 Dale (2004), p. 55 Shinsuke Satsuma, Britain and Colonial Maritime War in the Early Eighteenth Century: Silver Seapower and the Atlantic 56 (Woodbridge 2013), p.
57 Carswell (1960), p. 57 58 Hoppit (2000), p. Poitras (2000), p.
methods of debt repayment as the private correspondence between Drummond and Harley. The pamphlet postulates on page twenty that ‘money could be raised from land and malt if there is no other way’. This harkens back to the fall of the previous Whig regime under Godolphin that collapsed because of the reckless spending that took place, the Tory’s came in hoping to create stability, something that both the correspondence and this open letter support 59. Due to the nature of the source, the way it places so much emphasis on trade as opposed to the scheme proposed, which it only briefly addresses at the end leads us to question how much knowledge the source has of the company. The granting of the unrealistic monopolies specified in this source can also support the preface of the essay question that politics was the main cause of allowing events to unfold as they did. The South Sea Company’s purpose was to finance the government, not to trade. Harleys implementation of trading into the company’s charter was only as a result of pressure from the October club, a two hundred stock group of backbench Tories whom he needed to win over with this marvellous synthesis of finance, commerce and foreign policy 60. this source falls within the Carswell doctrine of business and government becoming intertwined and this having a knock on effect. After interrogating specific elements of such a large source it becomes clear how the Company’s fudging of an unrealistic trading scheme would lead to an over reliance on stock issue. Here we see a method of generating income that would lead to South Sea using the likes of Daniel Defoe and other speculator to push the price of stock in order to increase income for the company and investors. This would result in the company’s market value exceeding its net assets by over £60,000,000 61. In summary, there are deficiencies within the source, most notably it’s overemphasis on trade. What is more, it demonstrates the knock-on effects that the political climate was beginning to have and that the failure of trade was not a major factor in causing the stock to soar.
Until now the corruption and criminal actions of The South Sea Company have been seldom mentioned in this essay. The proclamation issued by King George for the return of Robert Knight was issued by His Majesty on the 23rd of January 1721. Placing this source in context it was a time of anger and indignation, so much so that there was the perceived threat of a
59 Peter George Muir Dickson, ‘Reviewed Work: Calendar of Treasury Books Preserved in the Public Record Office. Vol. 26, Part II by William A. Shaw’, The Economic History Review 60 16 , (1964), 570
61 Carswell (1960), p. 45 Peter Garber, ‘First Famous Bubbles’, the journal of economic perspectives 4 (1990), 52
exhibits how those who had managed to remain in power attempted to control the public narrative about the scandal. The king had a vested interest in controlling this narrative as him and his government had attempted to profit massively. Caroline Thomas characterises this type of corruption and fraud as being a feature of all aspects of this affair 66. Considered in the context of the historiographical debate this source can be applied to each individual I have addressed to some extent. It agrees with Carswell’s narrative of business and politics leading to damaging effects, and the king is the political figurehead of the nation. Coming to an accord with Brewer’s thesis that politics and finance were close to unravelling due to the royal finances being in jeopardy as well as public debt. Furthermore, the proclamation after some interrogation supports Hoppit’s analysis that politics were a vital factor in allowing the company’s influence and stock to spiral out of control. Moreover, this piece of primary information allows examination of not only the events that occurred, but how those in power sought to control the contemporary narrative and to some degree succeeded. As will be explored promptly, within Hogarth’s representation of the bubble there are no depictions of the King, Walpole, Blunt or any of the other individuals perceived to have played a significant role in the affair.
Representations of how the whole affair was viewed by those who experienced it can be found in this final source. A woodcut, titled the South Sea Scheme depicts the chaotic scenes surrounding the summer of 1720 and the speculation taking place. The source does this in a symbolic and satirical tone. The source itself was produced in 1721 by William Hogarth, a famous printmaker and satirist of the period. This was his first widely circulated print on the subject of the South Sea Company which he used to express his dissatisfaction with the Whig establishment 67. Within the print we can see Hogarth’s tendencies to accentuate moral characteristics of the situations he was depicting 68. Evidence of this moral interpretation of the South Sea affair is presented in multiple ways throughout the source. We can see honour being broken on a wheel by self-interest, referring to the corruption within parliament. Honesty is flogged by villainy which retains some resemblance to Robert knight, the infamous cashier and scapegoat. The devil himself is carving up fortune and throwing pieces to a baying crowd of investors. This is emblematic of the fever pitch speculation about the certainty of profit from investing in the South Sea company throughout the drawing rooms of
66 Caroline Thomas, ‘The South Sea Bubble’, Student Economic Review 17 (2003), 28 67 Ronald Paulson, Hogarth: the modern moral subject 1697-1732 (Cambridge 1992), p. 68 Hoppit (2000), p-
London 69 .a catholic, puritan and Jew can all be seen gambling in the lower left hand corner, with the cathedral of St Pauls pushed to the background of the print. Through this Hogarth attempts to show how the religious leaders had become complicit in these morally corrupt acts. From the granting of the royal charter priests were stationed on the boats sent as part of the company’s trade to the new world, the lords spiritual were also the group convincing King George to become governor as specified in the 1718 act. In Hogarth’s view none were without blame. To the far right we see the monument to the fire of London topped stalking wolves. A new inscription reads “this monument was erected in memory of the destruction of by the South Sea 1720” 70. Whereby Hogarth is suggesting that this event is as destructive as the great fire, a significant claim to say the least. Women are piling into the lottery house crowned with cuckold’s horns to gamble away their husband’s money. This aspect is compelling and something I feel that many histories neglect. At this time married woman could purchase stock, which lead to a much larger market for the South Sea Company’s stock and widened the bubbles effects. Depictions to this effect occur often within artwork surrounding the issue of the South Sea Bubble, such as scenes in change alley which had women pawning their jewellery to purchase stock 71. Finally, in the centre, framed by all else is the carousel of the scheme taking all the investors on a wild ride with crowds clamouring for a turn. Reverend William Stuckeley those who walked among such scenes claimed succeeding ages can have no idea of the atmosphere 72. This is an artistic attempt to illustrate wider causes and implications of the South Sea bubble. Furthermore, this source communicates Hogarth’s disdain for those involved, Whig and other, in a potent fashion. The Company and the damage it caused the result of a morally destitute group of people and institutions willing to participate in depraved and sinful practices in the pursuit of personal gain. To that effect the source is a perfect example of the explosion of satirical material that surrounded the bubble 73.
Presented in this source is a view not depicted by any of the other sources and t
69 Carswell (1960), p. 100
70 Andrew Stevens, Hogarth and the Shows of London (Wisconsin 1996), p.
71 Edward Matthew Ward, The South Sea Bubble: a scene in change alley in 1720, oil paint on canvas (1847) 72 Reverend William Stuckeley, ‘the family memoirs’, Publications of the Surtees Society, 73 (1880) pp. 59-60 73 Glaisyer (2006), p.
fact that it received parliamentary backing showed how the government love affair with credit was becoming dangerous. Conversely, the public letter was a good counterbalance to this proposal and pointed out many of the flaws in the scheme even if it did focus significantly more on trade than any other source. within the royal proclamation the framework was provided to question the corruption surrounding the company more extensively. On the other hand, because of the clandestine nature of many of the illegal activities taking place there are many aspects of the King’s involvement and financial manipulations that will remain hidden. Hogarth’s woodcut does the best in depicting public sentiment at the time and also a wide variety of causes of the South Sea bubble. Taken together these sources, while they do support the preface of the question used to them present an economic crisis with multiple factors stemming from the key facture of finance and politics. As for the effects the sources all point towards the phenomenon being an extremely violent financial and political event, however the damage caused by it would remain mainly in London, as many could not afford the cost of buying stock. Throughout the essay I have endeavoured to consider a multiplicity of voices and contributions to the debate.
There are specific aspects from each that support the sources and that come together to provide a coherent explanation of events. Carswell’s analysis of events provides great details of individuals and actions, while he focuses more on context it does provide some level of analysis. Through this a compelling argument is formulated that it was business hijacking a vulnerable, underdeveloped government structure of debt. When used in unison with Hoppit’s deeper analysis of the political causes alongside Harris’s financial viewpoints lead to a balanced picture of how the stock bubble occurred. Reasons includes factors such as poor trade performance, corruption in parliament and an overreliance on credit to finance expensive foreign wars. Yet, these other factors all to some extent stem from a deeper culture of politics within Britain. Ever since the glorious revolution the monarchy and by extension parliament had been in a precarious position. Indicative of this was the Jacobite risings of 1689 and 1715, the relatively quick turnover of monarchs, swinging elections and ballooning government debt 78. Yes, the political climate was responsible for the South Sea bubble as most of the factors that lead to it can be either directly or indirectly caused by this volatile climate. This subject raises a number of issues that can be applied to the current global economy. The South Sea Company and what it became validates concerns regarding the dangers that political animosity can have on financial policy, something we are currently 78 Jeremy Black, A Short History of Britain, (London 2015), p. 49-
experiencing in Britain as a result of exiting the European union 79. These are some lessons that can certainly be applied to current financial markets and their reliance on credit.
Bibliography
Primary sources
Anonymous, “A Letter to a Member of Parliament, occasion'd by the South-Sea Company's Scheme for reducing the publick Debts”, J. Roberts publishers, 2nd edition (London 1720), 3,4,5,
Drummond. John, “letter to Robert Harley, 22 August 1710”, the manuscripts of his grace the Duke of Portland, Vol 4, (Welbeck Abbey 1891), 572-
79 Craig Calhoun, populism, nationalism and Brexit, in William Outhwaite, Brexit: Sociological Responses, (London 2017), p.
Harris. Ron, ‘The Bubble Act: Its Passage and Its Effects on Business Organization’, The Journal of Economic History, vol 54 (1994), 610-
Hoppit. Julian, A land of liberty: England 1689-1727 (New York 2000), pp. 83, 334-
Hoppit. Julian, ‘The Myths of the South Sea Bubble’, Transactions of the Royal Historical Society 12 (2002), 141-
Melville. Lewis, The South Sea Bubble, (London 1921), p. IX
Paulson. Ronald, Hogarth: the modern moral subject 1697-1732 (Cambridge 1992), p.
Poitras. Geoffrey, The early history of financial economics 1478-1776: from commercial arithmetic to life annuities and joint stocks (Cheltenham 2000), pp-
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Satsuma. Shinsuke, Britain and Colonial Maritime War in the Early Eighteenth Century: Silver Seapower and the Atlantic (Woodbridge 2013), pp-
Stevens. Andrew, Hogarth and the Shows of London (Wisconsin 1996), p.
Stuckeley. Reverend William, ‘the family memoirs’, Publications of the Surtees Society, 73 (1880) pp. 59-
Caroline Thomas, ‘The South Sea Bubble’, Student Economic Review 17 (2003), 28
Urstad. Tone Sundt, Sir Robert Walpole's Poets: the use of literature as pro-government propaganda, 1721-1742 (1999), p. 61
Walsh. Patrick, ‘The South Sea Bubble: A Parable for Our Own Time’, History Ireland 17, (2009), 7
Ward. Edward Matthew, The South Sea Bubble: a scene in change alley in 1720, oil paint on canvas (1847)
Weston. Janet, ‘The South Sea Bubble by John Carswell’, The Journal of Finance 16 (1961), 446
Drummond. John, “letter to Robert Harley, 22 August 1710”, the manuscripts of his grace the Duke of Portland, Vol 4, (Welbeck Abbey 1891), 572-
South Sea stock bubble Final Essay 2.0
Module: History of Economic Thought (BEE1032)
University: University of Exeter
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