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Beauchamp & Childress - Principles of Biomedical Ethics
nursing (2115)
Harvard University
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Erlanger Medical Ethics Orientation Manual 1 of 12
Pr in cip le s of Biom e d ica l Et h ics
! Page numbers reference Garrett et. al., Health Care Ethics. Prentice Hall, 2nd Edition, 1993, unless ot her w ise indicat ed.
Additional References:
- Beauchamp and Childress, Principles of Biomedical Ethics, Fourth Edition. Oxford. 1994.
- Engelhardt, H. Tristram Oxford: The Foundations of Bioethics, second edition, Oxford. 1996
- Hall and Ellman, Health Care Law and Ethics, West. 1990.
- Junkerman and Schiedermayer, Practical Ethics for Students, Interns, and Residents. University Publishing Group, 1998
- American Medical Association Code of Medical Ethics, 1996
- American College of Physicians Ethics Manual, Third Edition, 1993. [These texts are available at the Erlanger Hospital Medical Library].
A standard approach to biomedical ethics, developed by Beauchamp and Childress in Principles of Biomedical Ethics, resolves ethical issues in terms of four ethical principles: Au t on om y [pages 1-6] Be n e f ice n ce & n on - m a le f ice n ce [pages 6-10] Ju st ice [pages 10-12] Each of which need to be weighed and balanced in determining an optimal course of action.
All of these principles require a conv er sat ion about the needs and desires of the patient or, in the case of justice, members of community. The principles are intended to guide. In the case of autonomy, we are required to determine the wishes of the patient in order to protect his or her autonomy. In the case of beneficence and non-maleficence, we are required to determine the patient’s views of what does and does not count as goods to be pursued or harms to be avoided. In the case of justice, we are required to follow due process in order to determine just limits on health care that will be generally accepted.
The demand for conversation arises out of what Englehardt sees as the result of the break down of any traditional consensus about moral and religious goods. In particular, he argues that in the post-modern period, we no longer accept the possibility of constructing a content-full account of the human good. We engage one another, consequently, as moral strangers, who need to negotiate moral arrangements. Those negotiations are governed by the principles of autonomy (he calls it permission) and beneficence, but even in the case of beneficence we cannot presume a general agreement about human goods and their ranking. Engelhardt argues that the traditional distinctions used to distinguish moral categories of treatment assume a vision of the good that is not available to us.
For better or for worse, health care practitioners find themselves in a situation where they need to become moral negotiators with moral strangers.
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The bioethical principles below are designed to be helpful guides to carrying out negotiations and conversations about treatment options.
Au t on om y :
1. W h a t is t h e m or a l b a sis of t h e p r in cip le of p a t ie n t a u t on om y or se lf - r u le? - The principle of autonomy is based on the Principle of Respect for Persons, which holds that individual persons have right to make their own choices and develop their own life plan (Garrett, 28). (See also American College of Physicians Ethics Manual, 2, 15.)
In a health care setting, the principle of autonomy translates into the principle of informed consent: You shall not treat a patient without the informed consent of the patient or his or her lawful surrogate, except in narrowly defined exceptions [see item 8 below] (Garrett, 29).
In order to affirm autonomy, every effort must be made to discuss treatment preferences with patients and to document them in the patients’ charts.
2. W h a t a r e t h e r e q u ir e m e n t s f or in f or m e d con se n t? ! The p a t ie n t or su r r og a t e must: - be competent, that is, capable of understanding consequences of the consent and capable making a free choice. - be free from coercion or undue influence.
! The h e a lt h ca r e p r ov id e r must: - provide and make understandable necessary information for making a free, intelligent treatment decision and must make sure that the patient or surrogate understands the information (30). - The only way to know if the patient understands the information is through reflective conversation with the health care provider. - The health care provider must recommend what he or she takes to be the optimal option and is free to persuade, without pressuring, the patient of this option (37). - Note that legal informed consent, e. signing a waiver, does not meet the moral standards of informed consent.
3. W h a t is r e q u ir e d f or a p e r son t o b e com p e t e n t? - One must presume that adult patients are competent.
- Competence to make medical decisions requires that the patient know that he or she is authorizing medical treatment and is able to understand effects of treatment, options in terms of health, life, lifestyle, religious beliefs, values, family friends, and all other factors bearing on treatment decision (31). (See also American College of Physicians Ethics Manual, 8.)
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patient's views and wishes and must not simply reflect the preferences or interests of the physician or surrogate (46; Beauchamp and Childress, 171 and American College of Physicians Ethics Manual, 7).
If there is no sufficient basis to make a substituted judgment, then the physician or surrogate must decide based on his or her judgment about what would be in the best interest of the patient (Beauchamp and Childress, 178 and American College of Physicians Ethics Manual, 7). Estimates of best interest are based on what a rational, normal person would prefer, not just on what the physician or surrogate prefers.
In cases in which the attending physician, nurse, patient, surrogate, patient family or other legitimately involved persons disagree about whether treatment would be in a patient’s best interest, a meeting should be called in which all such parties have a chance to exchange information and views. Often the hospital chaplain or family priest, minister, or rabbi can be of help in coming to agreement.
In cases where such a meeting does not result in agreement, interested parties should consult the institutional ethics committee.
When a surrogate or physician is acting against the expressed preferences or best interest of the patient and consultation with an institutional ethics committee fails to bring a resolution of the disagreement, the courts can be consulted to order treatment or appoint a conservator.
6. H ow m u ch d isclosu r e is r e q u ir e d in or d e r t o sa t isf y t h e d e m a n d f or in f or m e d con se n t? There are two different possible standards for full disclosure: A. The p r u d e n t p e r son r u le B. The su b j e ct iv e su b st a n t ia l d isclosu r e r u le (35-36)
The p r u d e n t p e r son r u le requires that the patient knows and understands: 1. The diagnosis 2. The nature and purpose of the proposed treatment. 3. The known risks and consequences of the proposed treatment, excluding those too remote and improbable or too well known to bear on the treatment decision. 4. Included should be the doctor’s and hospital’s success and failure rates with the proposed treatment and “judgment errors made in the course of care if such information affects the care of the patient” (American College of Physicians Ethics Manual, 9) 5. The benefits expected of the proposed treatment and the likelihood of their being realized. 6. All alternative treatments, with all the information for them mentioned in 3 and 4 above. 7. The prognosis if no treatment is given.
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- All costs and burdens of the treatment and of the alternatives mentioned in 5 above.
The su b j e ct iv e su b st a n t ia l d isclosu r e r u le requires that the health care provider describe to the patient everything material or important to that particular patient, that is, all information that could alter the patient’s reasoning about the treatment, given his or her principles, beliefs, and values. Not e t hat t his r ule inv alidat es any blank et disclosur e policy. For example, a blanket disclosure policy of not informing patient’s of improbable risks violates, or may violate this rule. Note also that the parallel requirement of informed consent in medical research demands that “no fact should be concealed that might cause the particular patient, or a reasonably prudent person, to refuse participation in the study” (263). (See also Beauchamp and Childress, 156).
7. Ar e t h e r e e x ce p t ion s t o t h e r e q u ir e m e n t t o se e k e x p licit in f or m e d con se n t? A. Implied consent- When consent is implied and procedures are not risky or invasive (American College of Physicians Ethics Manual, 7).
B. Therapeutic privilege- If there is a reason to believe that information given to a specific patient will results in an adverse effect on the patient's condition or health, information may be withheld. (See AMA Code, 8. and American College of Physicians Ethics Manual, 8) But note that studies show that health care providers misestimate their patents adverse responses. So therapeutic privilege is almost never justified (Beauchamp and Childress, 151).
C. Emergencies- If the patient is not competent and no surrogate is available and his or her advance wishes are not known and there is danger to life or danger of serious impairment to health, and immediate treatment is necessary to avert these dangers, then the obligation to seek informed consent is waived (39). (See AMA Code, 8 and American College of Physicians Ethics Manual, 7).
D. In a case in which the patient’s capacity to reason and sense of values may be affected by his or her illness or some transitory mood and treatment would bring about an irreversible state, the health care provider may be justified in postponing treatment even if the patient wants it, based on an appeal to beneficence (Hall-Ellman, 267).
8. W h e n is v iola t in g in f or m e d con se n t cle a r ly u n j u st if ie d?
- Non-emergencies with incompetent patients. If there is no surrogate available and no living will, Garrett argues that the courts should be used to appoint a guardian (40), but Beauchamp and Childress argue that “a hospital, a physician, or family member my justifiably be placed in a decision making role or go before a court or other authority to seek resolution of the issues before a decision is implemented” (170).
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patient’s interest. The second is the requirement to refrain from doing what damages the patient’s interest.
2. Ar e n ’t t h e se p r in cip le s t h e sa m e? I sn ’t a v oid ing h a r m j u st on e in st a n ce of b e n e f it in g a p e r son?
The difference between the principles rests on the char act er of t he av oidance of posit iv e har m and t he dem and for positiv e benefit. The following secondary principles come under the principle of n on - m a le f ice n ce :
- Do not kill.
- Do not cause needless pain.
- Do not incapacitate others (Beauchamp and Childress, 194). ⇒ The important point to notice is that each of these principles can be met by doing not hing.
The following are secondary principles falling under the principle of be n e f ice n ce :
- Prevent the infliction of needless pain.
- Prevent killing.
- Prevent incapacitating others. In a particular instance, for example, of standing by and watching a person who is undergoing a procedure done by an assistant, I might satisfy the principle of non maleficence by not causing needless pain, but violate the principle of beneficence by not preventing pain.
3. D o t h e se p r in cip le s r e q u ir e u s t o d o a ll g ood a nd a v oid a ll e v il?
Both principles are qualified by the recognition that there are limits on what each person can do and that many treatment options are mixed, containing both chance of benefit and risk of harm. Spelled out fully, the principle of beneficence means that unless there is a sufficient reason not to, one has an obligation do those acts that are likely to do more good than harm. The principle of non-maleficence means that unless there is a sufficient reason not to, one has an obligation not to do those acts that likely to produce more harm than good (Garrett et. al., 54-55).
4. H ow d o t h e se p r in cip le s h e lp u s t o m a k e t r e a t m e nt d e cision s?
There is no way to use these principles to make decisions in the abstract. A practitioner must take into consideration various social agreements about what is in the interest of the patient, the standard of care within the profession, what the patient or his or her surrogate, consistent with standards of informed consent, agrees to.
With these qualifications in mind, we can assert that the least controversial treatment is one that accords with the interest of the
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patient, is consistent with the standard of care within the profession, is agreed to by the patient, consistent with his or her informed consent, and satisfies both the principle of non maleficence and beneficence.
5. W h a t h a p p e n s if n ot a ll t h e se con d it ion s a r e m e t?
There is no general answer to this question, but typically the following rules of thumb are reasonable:
A. When there is a conflict between the two principles, the principle of non-maleficence trumps the principle of beneficence. For example, if harvesting two good kidneys from an almost but not quite dead man helps two patients on dialysis, we should not harvest the organs since doing so would violate the principle of non maleficence by harming the potential donor. Two good outcomes do not override the demand that we not harm patients (Beauchamp and Childress, 191).
B. When the doctor offers a treatment and recommends it, the patient’s informed decision against treatment trumps the medical practitioner’s offer of treatment whether under the category of obligatory treatment (medically indicated) or optional (Garrett et. al., 57).
C. When a procedure has both harmful and beneficial outcomes, - a treatment that is likely to bring significant benefit with only small risk of limited harm is obligatory (medically indicated) within the limits of informed consent. (Proportionally the treatment produces more good than harm.)
a treatment that is most likely to bring about significant harm with only small chance significant benefit, is obligatory not to offer (medically not indicated) even if the patient wants it. (Proportionally the treatment produces more harm than good.)
a treatment that is not likely to produce significantly more benefit than harm is optional (neither medically indicated nor medically not indicated). (Beauchamp and Childress, 211-15, use the language of obligation, and Garrett et. al., 58-61, use the language of medical indication.) (Proportionally the harm and good are equivalent.)
6. H ow d oe s on e t e ll w h a t b e n e f it s a n d h a r m s t h e p at ie n t? Ca n on e con sid e r q u a lit y of lif e?
Some ethicists argue that medical practitioners ought to distinguish questions of medical benefit, which fall within the expertise of medical practitioners, from questions of quality of life. For an example, see the discussion of Paul Ramsey’s views (Beauchamp and Childress, 216).
Other ethicists argue that there is no clear and distinct way to make judgments about medical benefit without making estimates of quality of
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In cases in which the attending physician, nurse, patient, surrogate, patient family or other legitimately involved persons disagree about whether treatment would be worthwhile, a meeting should be called in which all such parties have a chance to exchange information and views. Often the hospital chaplain or family priest, minister, or rabbi can be of help in coming to agreement. I f aft er such a m eet ing, t he inv olv ed par t ies st ill disagr ee, t he Et hics Com m it tee should be consult ed.
1 0. H ow d oe s t h is “ p a t ie n t in t e r e st ” or “ m e d ica l ind ica t ion s” a p p r oa ch t o cla ssif y in g t r e a t m e n t d if f e r f r om m or e t r a d it ion a l a ccou n t s? It replaces them.
Traditional accounts attempt to classify obligatory treatments and treatments obligatory not to offer in term of common sense notions of the differences between
preserving life causing death
withholding treatment withdrawing treatment
letting die causing death
withholding medication withholding nutrition and hydration
ordinary treatment extraordinary treatment
There are now well known problems with these common sense distinctions (Beauchamp and Childress, 196-211 and Garrett et. al., Chapter Six.). In addition, we can easily imagine cases where preserving life is against a patient’s interest, causing death might be a benefit, and so forth for the rest of the categories.
However, because of the unsettled character of these matters, careful attention must be given to deciding with a full understanding of the law and with sensitivity to the disagreements these issues engender.
Ju st ice
1. W h a t is t h e p r in cip le of j u st ice?
It is the principle that requires that we distribute goods and service, including medical goods and services, fairly.
2. H ow a r e w e t o d ist r ib u t e e x p e n siv e , sca r ce , m e d ica l se r v ice s w h e n n ot e v e r y on e ca n g e t w h a t h e or sh e n e e d s?
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The formal principle of justice requires that a health care practitioners and society in general treat equal cases equally. For example, two patients with the same medical need ought not be treated differently (Beauchamp and Childress, 329). This principle, though crucial, does not tell us what we need or which needs are most important.
3. H ow a r e n e e d s t o b e u n d e r st ood a n d w h a t is t h e ir sig n if ica n ce f or f a ir d ist r ib u t ion?
Need is the basis for the individual's claim to any basic good.Even though need may be difficult to define precisely in every case,especially so since it may have its source in either the individual or in
his social situation, disregarding individual’s needs amounts to neglect.4. W h a t f a ct or s con t r ib u t e t o d e t e r m in in g m e d ica l ne e d?
Medical need should be determined in terms of the following criteria: likely benefit to the patient, urgency of need, change in quality of life, duration of benefit.
Non-medical criteria for limits should not be used: ability to pay, social worth, obstacles to treatment, patient contribution to illness, and use of past resources (AMA Code, 2).
There are three different levels in which questions of social justice are raised: national, institutional, and individual.
5. H ow a r e p r ior it ie s t o b e d e t e r m in e d a t t h e n a t ion a l le v e l****?
- Medical need must be determined.
- Costs of basic goods must be considered when dealing with scarce resources.
- No society can provide everything that everyone needs, let alone what everyone wants.
- Economic considerations must be acknowledged to prevent destroying the economy. Beyond this, various proposals, all in some way problematic, have been offered (See Garrett et. al., 85-90).
6. Giv e n t h e d if f icu lt y of d e t e r m in in g a n a d e q u a t e a ccou n t of f a ir d ist r ib u t ion , h ow sh ou ld w e p r oce e d?
One approach, a procedural one, emphasizes the need for due process and specifically an open discussion of rationing policies. When we cannot know what is right with the help of a theory, we ought to insure that the acceptance of rationing limits proceeds through an open process that produces, as a result, a general consensus.
Beauchamp & Childress - Principles of Biomedical Ethics
Course: nursing (2115)
University: Harvard University
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