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Case Brief 28 - Employment Divison v. Smith
American Constitutional Law: Civil Liberties (POL 226)
Wake Forest University
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POL 226, Dr. Harriger – Janice Park
Employment Division v. Smith 494 U. 872 (1990)
Facts:
Legally Relevant Facts
: Alfred Smith and Galen Black were fired from their jobs for using peyote for sacramental use, which was prohibited by Oregon law. Their application for unemployment compensation was denied on the ground that they had been discharged for work-related “misconduct.”
Procedurally Relevant Facts
: Divided 6 to 3, the Supreme Court upheld the state’s action against the charge that it violated the Free Exercise clause. The Oregon Supreme Court held that the statutory prohibition was invalid under the Free Exercise Clause
Issue:
Whether the Free Exercise Clause for First Amendment permits the State of Oregon to include religiously inspired peyote use within the reach of its general criminal prohibition on use of that drug, and thus permits the State to deny unemployment benefits to persons dismissed from their jobs because of such religiously inspired use
Holding:
The decision of the Oregon Supreme Court is accordingly reversed.
Reasoning:
The free exercise of religion means, first and foremost, the right to believe and profess whatever religious doctrine one desires ... But the “exercise of religion” often involves not only belief and profession but the performance of (or abstention from) physical acts: assembling with others for a worship service, participating in sacramental use of bread and wine, proselytizing, abstaining from certain foods or certain modes of transportation. It would be true, we think (though no case of ours has involved the point), that a state would be “prohibiting the free exercise [of religion]” if it sought to ban such acts of abstentions only when they are engaged in for religious reasons, or only because of the religious belief that they display.
Respondents in the present case, however, seek to carry the meaning of “prohibiting the free exercise [of religion]” one large step further. They contend that their religious motivation for using peyote places them beyond the reach of a criminal law that is not specifically directed at their religious practice, and that is concededly constitutional as applied to those who use the drug for other reasons ... As a textual matter, we do not think the words must be given that meaning. It is no more necessary to regard the collection of a general tax, for example, as “prohibiting the free exercise [of religion]” by those citizens who believe support of organized government to be sinful, than it is to regard the same tax as “abridging from freedom ... of the press” or those publishing companies that must pay the tax as a condition of staying in business.
We have never held that an individual’s religious beliefs excuse him from compliance with an otherwise valid law prohibiting conduct that the State is free to regulate ... There being no contention that Oregon’s drug law represents an attempt to regulate religious beliefs, the communication of religious beliefs, or the
POL 226, Dr. Harriger – Janice Park
raising of one’s children in those beliefs, the rule to which we have adhered ever since Reynolds plainly controls.
Respondents argue that even though exemption from generally applicable criminal law need not automatically be extended to religiously motivated actors, at least the claim for a religious exemption must be evaluated under the balancing test set forth in Sherbert v. Verner, 374 U. 398 (1963). We have never invalidated any governmental action on the basis of the Sherbert test except the denial of unemployment compensation. In recent years we have abstained from applying the Sherbert test at all. Even if we were inclined to breathe into Sherbert some life beyond the unemployment compensation field, we would not apply it to require exemptions from a generally applicable criminal law.
It is no more appropriate for judges to determine the “centrality” of religious beliefs before applying a “compelling interest” test in the free exercise field, than it would be for them to determine the “importance” of ideas before applying the “compelling interest” test in the free speech field. Because respondents’ ingestion of peyote was prohibited under Oregon law, and because that prohibition is constitutional, Oregon may, consistent with the Free Exercise Clause, deny respondents unemployment compensation when their dismissal results from use of the drug.
Dissenting Opinion:
Justice Blackmun
: There is no evidence that the religious use of peyote has ever harmed anyone or there were illegal traffic in peyote.
Case Brief 28 - Employment Divison v. Smith
Course: American Constitutional Law: Civil Liberties (POL 226)
University: Wake Forest University
