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Team 1438 IN THE INTERNATIONAL COURT OF JUSTICE

null

THE HAGUE, THE NETHERLANDS AT THE PEACE PALACE

THE CASE CONCERNING THE PROTECTION OF SEA TURTLES IN THE

CHELONIA SEA REGION

THE FEDERAL STATES OF ATTERAC

APPLICANT

v. THE REPUBLIC OF REDONDA RESPONDENT

MEMORIAL FOR THE RESPONDENT

THE 2013 STETSON MOOT COURT COMPETITION

I

TABLE OF CONTENTS ............................................................................................................. I

INDEX OF AUTHORITIES ....................................................................................................... V

STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION ....................................................................................... IX

QUESTIONS PRESENTED ...................................................................................................... X

STATEMENT OF FACTS ....................................................................................................... XI

SUMMARY OF ARGUMENTS ........................................................................................... XIII

ARGUMENTS .............................................................................................................................. 1

I. RESPONDENT DID NOT VIOLATE ITS INTERNATIONAL ENVIRONMENTAL

OBLIGATIONS. .................................................................................................................. 1

A. RESPONDENT DID NOT VIOLATE THE CSA. ....................................................................... 1

Respondent is not a party to the CSA because Respondent9s signature does not amount to an expression of consent. ............................................................................................ 1
Respondent has no legal obligation to implement the CSA. .......................................... 2
Respondent did not defeat the object and purpose of the CSA. ...................................... 2 B. RESPONDENT DID NOT VIOLATE REGIONAL CUSTOMARY LAW. ........................................ 3
The CSA is not regional customary law. ........................................................................ 3 a. There is no State practice of the CSA. ........................................................................ 3 b. There is no opinio juris. .............................................................................................. 4
Even assuming that it is regional customary law, Respondent, as a persistent objector, is not bound by it............................................................................................................. 5

III

a. The Maroons acquired the KST residing in Redonda by the process of tagging. .... 14 b. The Maroons9 traditional hunting is not for a primarily commercial purpose. ........ 15 c. Hunting in the presential sea is a legal means of acquiring the KST. ...................... 16 d. The Maroons carry the KST when entering Respondent9s territory. ........................ 16 4. Assuming arguendo that the Maroons are not exempt, a certificate of introduction would be superfluous. ................................................................................................... 16 E. RESPONDENT DID NOT VIOLATE GENERAL PRINCIPLES OF INTERNATIONAL ENVIRONMENTAL LAW. ................................................................................................... 17

The precautionary principle cannot be applied to the Maroons9 use of the KST. ........ 17 a. Assuming that the precautionary principle applies, Respondent complied with the same. ......................................................................................................................... 18
Respondent cooperated with the Chelonian States by recognizing the KST as a shared resource. ........................................................................................................................ 18

II. RESPONDENT DID NOT VIOLATE THE UNCLOS, BUT RATHER, FURTHERED THE TREATY’S OBJECTIVE. ............................................................. 19 A. RESPONDENT DID NOT VIOLATE THE UNCLOS IN ITS EXERCISE OF SOVEREIGNTY OVER ITS WATERS. ...................................................................................................................... 19 1. Respondent validly exercised its sovereignty over its territorial sea. ........................... 19 2. Respondent validly exercised its sovereignty over its EEZ. ......................................... 19 B. THE RPSA DOES NOT IMPAIR THE FREEDOM OF THE HIGH SEAS. .................................. 20

Respondent merely asserts its interest over its presential sea and does not exclude other States from the enjoyment of the said area. .................................................................. 20
The RPSA furthers the objectives of the UNCLOS to conserve and manage the living resources of the high seas. ............................................................................................ 21 a. The RPSA extends the prohibition imposed upon the rest of the Redondan citizens, with regard to the hunting of the KST, to Respondent9s presential sea. ................... 21 b. Respondent, in fact, encouraged the other States to prohibit respective nationals from hunting the KST within the presential sea. ...................................................... 21

IV

Respondent, in allowing the Maroons to hunt the KST in its presential sea, complied with the UNCLOS......................................................................................................... 22

III. RESPONDENT ACTED IN ACCORDANCE WITH THE ICESCR IN ALLOWING THE MAROONS TO EXERCISE THEIR CULTURAL PRACTICE. ....................... 22 A. THE MAROONS, BEING A MINORITY, ARE PROTECTED BY THE ICESCR. ...................... 22

The Maroons are a minority under International Law. ................................................. 22
Minority rights are protected under the ICESCR. ........................................................ 23
Respondent9s exemption of the Maroons is a recognition of their rights. .................... 24 a. Respondent has the duty to protect the rights of the Maroons. ................................. 24 b. Respondent protected the Maroons9 right to partake in cultural life. ....................... 24 B. THE MAROONS ARE <PEOPLE= WHO ARE AFFORDED THE RIGHT OF SELF- DETERMINATION. .............................................................................................................. 25

IV. APPLICANT, IN FORCING RESPONDENT TO PROHIBIT THE CULTURAL PRACTICE OF THE MAROONS, VIOLATED THE MAROONS’ ABSOLUTE RIGHT OF SELF-DETERMINATION. ......................................................................... 25 A. SELF-DETERMINATION IS A NON-DEROGABLE JUS COGENS NORM. ................................. 25 B. A JUS COGENS NORM JUSTIFIES NON-OBSERVANCE OF TREATIES. .................................. 26 C. APPLICANT, IN ATTEMPTING TO OBLITERATE THE MAROONS’ RITUAL, VIOLATED THE JUS COGENS NORM OF SELF-DETERMINATION. ................................................................ 26

CONCLUSION AND PRAYER FOR RELIEF ....................................................................... 27

VI

Resolutions of the Conference of the Parties Conf.12 (Rev) Permits and Certificates.

17

Resolutions of the Conference of the Parties Conf.13 (Rev) Control of Trade in Personal and Household Effects.

15,16,

Resolutions of the Conference of the Parties Conf.5 Definition of 8primarily commercial purposes. 16 Rio Declaration on Environment and Development, U. Doc. A/CONF/26 (1992).

6,

UN Committee on Economic, Social, and Cultural Rights [UNCESCR] General Comment No, E/C/GC/21. 24 UNEP-CBD Guidelines, Addis Ababa Principles and Guidelines for the Sustainable Use of Biodiversity, Secretariat of the Convention on Biological Diversity 7 (2004).

10

UNEP Environmental Law Guidelines and Principles. 19 United Nations Conference on the Law of Treaties. UN Doc A/Conf. 39. UNCLOT II.

4

United Nations General Assembly, Resolution 1803(XVII) (Dec,1962). 6 UN Treaty Section of the Office of Legal Affairs, Treaty Handbook, No. E.02 (2002), available at: treaties.un/doc/source/publications/THB/English.pdf.

1

UNEP Challenges to International Waters: Regional Assessments in a Global Perspective (2006).

9 JUDICIAL AND ARBITRAL DECISIONS

Arrest Warrant of 11 April 2000 (Dem. Rep. Congo v. Belg.), 2002 I.C.J. 5 Asylum (Colom. v. Peru), 1950 I.C. 266. 3, Case Concerning Certain German Interests in Polish Upper Silesia (Ger. v. Pol.), 1926 P.I.C. Ser. A, No. 7, at 30.

1

Corfu Channel (U. v. Alb.), 1949 I.C. 4. 8 East Timor (Portugal v. Australia). I.C. Reports (1995). 27 Fisheries (U. v. Nor.), 1951 I.C. 116. 5 Legality of the Threat or Use of Nuclear Weapons, Advisory Opinion, 1996 I.C. 226.

3

Trail Smelter (United States v. Canada), Arbitral Tribunal, 1941. 8

VII

BOOKS, TREATISES, DIGESTS AND RESTATEMENTS

BARNES, PROPERTY RIGHTS AND NATURAL RESOURCES (2009) 7

BLANCO & RAZZAQUE, GLOBALISATION AND NATURAL RESOURCES LAW:

CHALLENGES, KEY ISSUES AND PERSPECTIVES (2012).

7 BROWNLIE, PRINCIPLES OF PUBLIC INTERNATIONAL LAW (2008). 1

CGASSESSELOWKA, ET AL, INTERNATIONAL ., A GUIDE TO THE LAW (2001). CONVENTION ON BIOLOGICAL 6

DIVERSITY(1994).

5 HANQIN, TRANSBOUNDARY DAMAGE IN INTERNATIONAL LAW (2003). 8,

HONKONEN, THE COMMON BUT DIFFERENTIATED RESPONSIBILITY

PAND RINCIPLE IN POLICY AMSPECTS ULTILATERAL (2009). ENVIRONMENTAL AREEMENTS: REGULATORY

13 KOVALEV, CONTEMPORARY ISSUES OF THE LAW OF THE SEA: MODERN

RUSSIAN APPROACHES (2004).

7 LMINC,N TAIRHE ,U TNIFYING HE LAW OF ROLE OF TREATIES HARM IN (1961). ENVIRONMENTAL LAW (2006). 10

NORDQUIST, UNCLOS, 1982: A COMMENTARY (1975). 20,21,

PARADELL-TRIUS, PRINCIPLES OF INTERNATIONAL ENVIRONMENTAL LAW:

AN OVERVIEW. RECIEL 9(2) (2000).

19 SSHAWCHACHTER, INTERNATIONAL , INTERNATIONAL LAW (2008). LAW THEORY AND PRACTICE (1991). 1, 3,5,7 8,

SSUMMERSELF-DETERMINATION , PEOPLE AND SHAPE INTERNATIONAL CONTEMPORARY LAWL: AW OF HOW NNATIONS ATIONALISM AND (2007) 26

WITHERINGTON, SEA TURTLES: AN EXTRAORDINARY NATURAL HISTORY OF

SOME UNCOMMON TURTLE (2006)

12 YOUNG, TRADING FISH, SAVING FISH: THE INTERACTION BETWEEN REGIMES

IN INTERNATIONAL LAW (2011)

14 ESSAYS, ARTICLES, AND JOURNALS

Akehurst, International Liability for Injurious Consequences Arising out of Acts not Prohibited by International Law , Netherlands Yearbook of International Law vol 1985.

9

Dalton, The Chilean Mar Presencial: A Harmless Concept of a Dangerous Precedent? (1993). 8(3) The International Journal of Marine and Coastal Law

21

Eckert, Environmental Unpredictability and Leatherback Sea Turtle (Dermochelyscoriacea) Nest Loss , Inter American Convention for the Protection and Conservation of Sea Turtles, Herpetologica Vol (1987).

11,

Klemm, POL 9 Y & L.No (1993). Guideline for Legislation to Implement CITES, IUCN ENV 9 L 16, Klemm, Migratory Species in International Law , Natural Resource Journal, 949, (1989).

19 IX

STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION

In accordance with Article 40 of the Statute of the International Court of Justice, the

Republic of Redonda and the Federal States of Atterac submitted the following dispute to the Court on 14 June 2013. The parties signed a special agreement to submit their dispute to the Registrar of the Court. See Special Agreement Between the Federal States of Atterac and the Republic of Redonda for Submission to the ICJ of Differences Between Them Concerning Questions Relating to the Protection of Sea Turtles, signed at Georgetown, Cayman Islands on 14 June 2013. The Registrar of the Court addressed notification to the parties on 21 June 2013.

X

QUESTIONS PRESENTED

I. WHETHER RESPONDENT VIOLATED INTERNATIONAL ENVIRONMENTAL

LAW IN ALLOWING THE MAROONS TO USE THE KILPKONN SEA TURTLES.

II. WHETHER RESPONDENT VIOLATED THE UNCLOS IN ALLOWING THE

MAROONS TO USE THE KIPLKONN SEA TURTLES AND ENACTING THE

RPSA.

III. WHETHER RESPONDENT ACTED IN ACCORDANCE WITH THE ICESCR IN

ALLOWING THE MAROONS TO EXERCISE THEIR CULTURAL PRACTICE.

IV. WHETHER APPLICANT VIOLATED RESPONDENT9S JUS COGENS RIGHT OF

SELF-DETERMINATION.

XII

its international obligations in allowing the Maroons to continue with its cultural practices (R) of hunting the KST and collecting its eggs (R). Respondent asserts that as a signatory to the CSA, it has implemented laws protecting the KST (Cl). It also claims that the exemption to the Maroons9 ritual (Cl,26) is a mere observance of its obligation under the International Covenant on Economic, Social, and Cultural Rights (<ICESCR=)(R). Failing to resolve the matter, the Parties agreed to submit the matter to the International Court of Justice for adjudication.

XIII

SUMMARY OF ARGUMENTS

Respondent, in allowing the Maroons to use the KST, did not violate its treaty obligations

because it is not bound by the CSA. It also did not violate regional customary law since the CSA cannot be considered as such. There was no violation of the Convention on Biological Diversity (<CBD=) as Respondent acted well-within its sovereign right to exploit its natural resources and did not cause transboundary harm. Similarly, it did not violate the Convention on International Trade in Endangered Species (<CITES=) given that the Maroons9 hunting of the KST and the collection of its eggs are considered within the exemption thereto. Lastly, the general principles of international environmental law were not violated since Respondent acted in accordance thereto. Respondent furthered the objective of the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (<UNCLOS=) by enacting the RPSA. Moreover, in allowing the Maroons to use the KST for its traditional rituals, Respondent acted in accordance with the ICESCR in upholding the Maroons9 absolute right of self-determination. Respondent submits that, in fact, it is Applicant who violated this right.

2

agreed that ratification of the CSA is necessary considering that eleven State parties ratified the treaty (R,Cl). 7 Third , Respondent9s non-ratification shows its intent to not give the effect of consent to the signature of its representative (R). 8 Further, Applicant specifically admitted that Respondent is not a party to the treaty (R). Clearly, the States intended for the CSA to be ratified. Thus, Respondent, being a mere signatory, is not bound by the CSA.

Respondent has no legal obligation to implement the CSA. There is no affirmative duty imposed on signatories to a treaty to perform certain acts or to carry out its specific provisions. 9 In this case, the CSA explicitly imposes the affirmative duty to enforce measures to protect the KST (Annex B). Being a mere signatory to the CSA, Respondent is not bound by this affirmative duty. This is supported by Art. X of the CSA.

Respondent did not defeat the object and purpose of the CSA. A signatory to the CSA is merely prohibited from defeating its object and purpose, 10 which is to promote the protection, conservation, and recovery of sea turtle populations and of the habitats on which they depend on (Annex B). Furthermore, Art. II of the CSA recognizes the cultural characteristics of the Maroons as an exception. 6 VCLT, art(a). 7 VCLT, art(b). 8 VCLT, art(c). 9 VCLT, art. 10 VCLT, art; Rogoff, The International Legal Obligations of Signatories to an Unratified Treaty , 32 ME. RE(1980).

3

It bears emphasis that Respondent refrained from acts which defeat the object and purpose of the CSA. In fact, Respondent upheld the object and purpose of the CSA by enacting and implementing a law prohibiting its nationals from killing or capturing KST and collecting their eggs (Cl,11). While Respondent exempts the Maroons from this prohibition, it nonetheless limits the exemption to use in adulthood rites and subsistence purposes in order to protect, conserve, and recover KST population (Cl).

RESPONDENT DID NOT VIOLATE REGIONAL CUSTOMARY LAW. The CSA is not regional customary law. To qualify as international custom, there must be State practice and opinio juris. 11 For a regional or local custom, there must be proof of constant and uniform usage practiced by the States. 12 In this case, while most of the States are party to the CSA, this does not automatically qualify it as a custom. The substance and provisions of the CSA must be shown to exist in the actual practice and opinio juris of States.

There is no State practice of the CSA. Regional customary law requires a higher standard of proof than general customary law. 13 While a general custom may be created by a majority or a substantial minority of

11 Opinion on the Legality of the Threat or Use of Nuclear Weapons, 1996 I.C. Reports, 226,253; 110 ILR 163; Statute of the International Court of Justice, June 26,1945, art(1)(b), 33 U.N.T.S [I.C. Statute].

12 Asylum (Colom. v. Peru), 1950 I.C.J (Nov. 20). 13 SHAW, supra note 2, at 92-93.

5

Even assuming that it is regional customary law, Respondent, as a persistent objector, is not bound by it. A persistent objector is a State which has expressed its objection to the practice throughout the process of formation and development of the custom and thus, cannot be bound by such custom. 18 Performing acts inconsistent with State practice is considered as persistent objection. 19 Like State practice, it is evidenced by treaty-making, legislation, and official State publications 20 such as diplomatic interchanges and the opinions of national legal advisors. 21 Respondent9s non-ratification of the CSA, exemption of the Maroons from the coverage of its law prohibiting the killing of the KSTs, and various diplomatic exchanges with Applicant, are proof of its persistent objection to the CSA (R, 25). Thus, the CSA, even if customary, is not binding upon Respondent.

RESPONDENT DID NOT VIOLATE THE CBD, BUT IN FACT ACTED IN ACCORDANCE THERETO. The CBD 22 emphasizes the government9s role in implementing its provisions 23 <as far as possible and as appropriate.= 24 In allowing the Maroons to continue practicing the adulthood rite,

18 Fisheries (U. v. Nor.), 1951 I.C.J. 19 Fisheries, supra note 18; SHAW, supra note 2 at 90. 20 Arrest Warrant of 11 April 2000 (Dem. Rep. Congo v. Belg.), 2002 I.C.J. 21 SHAW, supra note 2, at 83-84. 22 Convention on Biological Diversity, Jun,1992, 1760 U.N.T.S [CBD]. 23 GLOWKA, ET AL., A GUIDE TO THE CONVENTION ON BIOLOGICAL DIVERSITY 35 (1994). 24 CBD, arts-6.

6

Respondent considered the needs of its citizens while implementing measures consistent with the CBD.

Respondent exercised its right to exploit its natural resources in accordance with the CBD. Article 3 applies the customary law 25 of a State9s sovereign right to use its natural resources 26 pursuant to its national environmental policies. 27 Respondent legitimately exercised its right to exploit in allowing the Maroons to hunt the KST and harvest its eggs (R) through national legislation.

Respondent has a sovereign right to exploit the KST within its territory. The power to exploit natural resources within a State9s territory 28 embraces the power to control its use. 29 The KST nests on the beaches (R) and the KST hunted in territorial waters and EEZ of Respondent are its own natural resources 30 which can be exploited with government authorization. 31 The authorized use (R) of the KST in the Maroons9 adulthood rites (R) is a

25 Rio Declaration on Environment and Development, prin, U.N.Doc.A/CONF.151/5/Rev(1992) [Rio]. 26 UN General Assembly, Res(XVII), 14 Dec. 27 CBD, art. 28 Declaration of the United Nations Conference on the Human Environment, prin, U.N.Doc.A/CONF/ 14/Rev (1972) [Stockholm]. 29 Simmons, On the Territorial Rights of States, Philosophical Issues: Social, Political and Legal Philosophy, vol (2001) 321; CASSESSE, INTERNATIONAL LAW, 88-89 (2001). 30 UN, supra note 26. 31 Kovalev. Contemporary Issues of the Law of the Sea: Modern Russian Approaches (Butler, ed.) 56-57 (2004).

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