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Pakistan foreign policy 1947-2004
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####### APRIL 2004
Pakistan’s
Foreign Policy:
An Overview
1947-
Pakistan’s
Foreign Policy:
An Overview
1947 - 2004
1111
####### APRIL 2004
Pakistan’s
Foreign Policy:
An Overview
1947-
Pakistan’s
Foreign Policy:
An Overview
1947 - 2004
CONTENTSCONTENTS
Abbreviations and Acronyms Foreword Profile of the Author
Introduction Major Phases of Pakistan's Foreign Policy
a. 1947-53: Exploration and Friendship with All
- Foundations of the Foreign Policy
- Relations with India
- Relations with Afghanistan
- Security Imperatives
- Relations with U.S. and U.S.S.
- Relations with Muslim Countries
b. 1953-62: Alignment with the West
- Alignment with the West
- Mutual Defence Assistance Agreement
- SEATO
- The Baghdad Pact / CENTO
- Defence and Economic Assistance from the U.
- Cost of Alignment with the West
- Relations with China
c. 1962-71: Transition
- Rethinking about the Alignment Policy
- Improving Relations with the Soviet Union
- Improving Relations with China
- Diminishing Ties with the U.
- Pluralistic Perspective
- Relations with India
- Crisis in East Pakistan and International Response
09 10
10
10 10 10 11 11 11
12
12 12 12 12 13 13 13
14
14 14 14 15 15 16 16
1947-
1947-
CONTENTSCONTENTS
d. 1972-79: Bilateralism and Nonalignment
- Pak-India Relations: towards improvement
- Strengthening of Ties with Major Powers
- Nuclear Technology and Relations with the U.
- Pakistan and the Muslim World
e. 1980-90: Afghanistan and Partnership with the United States
- Soviet Invasion of Afghanistan
- Revival of Pakistan-U. Relations
- Pakistan-China Relations
- Pakistan and the OIC
- Pakistan-India: a policy of Dialogues
- The Geneva Accords on Afghanistan
- Post-withdrawal Problems
f. 1990-2001: Post Cold War Era and Pakistan's Dilemmas
- Another Drift in Pak-US Relations
- Continuation of the Afghanistan Problem
- Insurgency in Kashmir
- Going Nuclear
g. 2001 Onwards: Counter Terrorism
- September 11 and Fight Against Terrorism
- Increased U. Support
- Détente with India
- Pakistan's Relations with China and Russia
- Muslim World and Pakistan
- Transfer of Nuclear Technology
Concluding Observations Select Bibliography
17
17 17 18 18
19
19 19 19 19 19 20 20
21
21 21 22 22
24
24 24 25 26 26 26
27 28
akistan's Foreign Policy: an Overview, a briefing paper by PILDAT, is a special presentation in the context of the PILDAT Short Course for Parliamentarians and Politicians on The Foreign Policy Process in Pakistan. Developed by PILDAT, as a
Ppart of the Pakistan Legislative Strengthening Consortium - PLSC, supported financially by the USAID, the paper looks
at the major foreign policy phases and development of perspectives in the foreign policy of Pakistan. The paper has been especially commissioned by PILDAT to provide a comprehensive overview of Pakistan's foreign policy from 1947-2004. The briefing paper, essentially prepared for parliamentarians, can also serve as a stand-alone reference document on the foreign policy of Pakistan to-date.
Authored by the renowned defence and political analyst, Prof. Dr. Hasan-Askari Rizvi, the paper attempts to present an objective and factual commentary, covering accurate history and shaping of foreign policy perspectives. PILDAT strongly feels that foreign policy should be reviewed and influenced by the supreme policy-making institution of the country: Parliament. It is in this perspective that PILDAT bids to provide an objective and comprehensive overview of the Pakistani foreign policy since independence so as to orient parliamentarians towards the dynamics, actors and influencing factors on foreign policy.
This briefing paper is a part of the series of the papers and studies PILDAT has compiled on the subject of foreign policy. Another briefing paper covers the spectrum of the process of foreign policy formulation in Pakistan; a previous briefing paper examines the issue of Pakistan-India Relationship in detail, while three separate case studies examine the formulation of Pakistan's Foreign Policy with special reference to Gulf Crisis-1990; Comparison among Lahore, Agra and Islamabad Summits and the Recognition of Taliban by Pakistan. PILDAT hopes that these papers and the studies, both individually and collectively, serve the purpose of raising awareness of parliamentarians on the dynamics of foreign policy in Pakistan as well as build their capacity to take a pro-active role in formulation, review, analysis and influencing of foreign policy of Pakistan.
The author, PILDAT and its team of researchers have made every effort to ensure the accuracy of the contents of this paper. PILDAT, however, does not accept any responsibility of any omission or error as it is not deliberate.
The views expressed in this paper belong to the author and are not necessarily shared by PILDAT, PLSC or USAID.
Lahore April 2004
1947-
PROFILE OF THE AUTHORPROFILE OF THE AUTHORPROFILE OF THE AUTHOR
Prof. Dr. Hasan-Askari Rizvi is an independent Defence and Political Consultant based in Lahore.
Prof. Dr. Hasan Askari holds M. and Ph in Political Science/International Relations from the University of Pennsylvania, U and M in Politics from the University of Leeds, UK. He was Quaid-e-Azam Professor of Pakistan Studies at Columbia University, New York (December 1995-July 1999), and Allama Iqbal Professor at South Asia Institute, Heidelberg University, Germany (February 1998-January 1991), and Research Scholar at University of New Mexico and Sandia National Laboratories, Albuquerque (2002). He was also on the Faculty of Political Science, Punjab University, Lahore, including Professor and Chairman Department of Political Science.
He is a widely published scholar with over 60 research papers, monographs and chapters in edited volumes published in the U., the U, Germany, Holland, Nepal and Pakistan. He is a regular contributor of political commentaries to the national dailies of Pakistan. His books include Military, State and Society in Pakistan (New York:St. Martin's Press, 2000), Pakistan and the Geostrategic Environment (London: Macmillan, 1993), The Military and Politics in Pakistan (Lahore: 1976,1986, 2000), and Internal Strife and External Intervention (Lahore: 1981).
Prof. Dr. Hasan-Askari Rizvi also serves on the Board of Advisors of PILDAT.
1947-
INTRODUCTIONINTRODUCTIONINTRODUCTION
akistan is a major participant in the global efforts to curb transnational terrorism initiated after the terrorist attacks in the United States in September 2001. This enhanced Pakistan's strategic relevance for the major powers, especially the
PUnited States, which cultivated Pakistan for combating terrorism and ensuring peace and stability in the post-Taliban
Afghanistan. They also wanted that the Taliban and Al-Qaeda activists, formerly based in Afghanistan, did not create safe havens in Pakistani territory with the support of their Pakistani sympathisers.
Pakistan has not always been so relevant to global politics. Its strategic relevance has varied over time which had implications for Pakistan's role at the international level and the foreign policy options available to its policy makers. This briefing paper examines the changing patterns of Pakistan's foreign policy and how its position and role in international and regional politics has varied over time.
Pakistan recognises that it is neither possible nor advisable to stay in isolation in the present day interdependent and complex international system. It needs to interact with other states, international and regional organisations and supranational actors in order to protect and promote its national interests and sovereign identity. Pakistan also collaborates with other states in order to cope with the issues of global dimensions like environment, population, poverty and underdevelopment, energy, human migrations and refugees, drugs, and terrorism.
Despite pursuing a pro-active foreign policy Pakistan does not have the ambition and capacity to assume the role of a global or regional power. Its activism reflects a realisation that such a policy facilities the mobilisation of International support and resources for its domestic socio-economic development, helps to regulate the inputs from the external environment into the internal context, and contributes to strengthening security and territorial integrity which are the principal concerns of Pakistan's foreign policy.
The major focus of Pakistan's foreign policy is security against external and internal challenges to its national identity, territorial integrity and independence. Another foreign policy interest is the cultivation of close and brotherly relations with the Muslim states. Pakistan highlights sovereign equality of states, bilateralism, mutuality of interests, and non-interference in each other's domestic affairs as the cardinal features of its foreign policy. Pakistan firmly believes that it has to work within the norms and institutions of the international system but it supports their restructuring for brining them in line with the realities currently obtaining in the International system. Pakistan, therefore, maintains a strong faith in the principles enunciated in the United Nations Charter and takes an active part in the deliberations of the UN and other International and regional organisations. Pakistan also identifies with the political and economic concerns of the developing countries. Other leading foreign policy goals include support to the right of self determination for the subjugated nations, oppositions to apartheid and the remnants of colonialism, peaceful resolution of inter-state disputes, arms control and nuclear non-proliferation, and promotion of peace and stability through international and regional cooperation.
The principal strategies and mechanisms to pursue these foreign policy goals have varied over time. These changes help to identity the major phases in Pakistan's foreign policy. Though each phase is characterised by a set of major themes and operational strategies, these overlap and reflect continuity and change.
1947-
09
Major Phases of Pakistan's Foreign Policy
The major phases of Pakistan's foreign policy are:
a. 1947-53: Explorations and friendship with all
b. 1953-62: Alignment with the West
c. 1962-71: Transition
d. 1972-79: Bilateralism and nonalignment
e. 1980-90: Afghanistan and Partnership with the U.
f. 1990-2001: Post-Cold War Era and Pakistan's Dilemmas
g. 2001 onwards: Pakistan and Counter Terrorism
1947-53: Exploration and Friendship with All
Quaid-i-Azam Mohammad Ali Jinnah, the founder of Pakistan and its first Governor-General, gave two special talks on radio to introduce Pakistan to the people of the United States and Australia. He expressed a strong desire to develop friendly ties with other states on the eve of his meeting with the special representative of the King of Afghanistan in December 1947. Similar views were expressed when the first ambassadors of Burma (January 1948), France (January 1948), the United States (February 1948), Turkey (March 1948) and Afghanistan (May 1948) presented their credentials. Outlining the goals of foreign policy, Jinnah declared:
“Our foreign policy is one of friendliness and goodwill towards the nations of the world. We do not cherish aggressive designs against any country or nation. We believe in the principle of honesty and fair-play in national and international dealings and are prepared to make our utmost contribution to the promotion of peace and prosperity among the nations of the world. Pakistan will never be found lacking in extending its material and moral support to the oppressed and suppressed peoples of the world, and in upholding the principles of the United Nations Charter.”
Pakistan joined the United Nations on September 30 1947, as a new member and stayed in the Commonwealth. Its
Foundations of the Foreign Policy
leadership established contacts with other states, emphasising friendship with all, promotion of peace and harmony, support for liberation of the colonised people, and a strict observance of the principles of international conduct as enshrined in the UN Char ter.
The early years of independence were dominated by Pakistan's problems with India on the one hand, and the efforts to introduce the new state to the world community on the other. The problems it developed with India in the immediate aftermath of independence left an indelible impact on its foreign policy and built hostility and distrust into Pakistan-India relations. Most of these problems were the product of the partition process, as set out in the 3rd June 1947 Plan and the Indian Independence Act, July 1947. These included, interalia, the division of the funds and other assets of the British Indian government, including arms, equipment and stores of the British Indian military; the large scale killing of people at the time of independence and the subsequent communal riots; the religious minorities in the two states; the disposal of evacuee property; the river-water dispute; and bilateral trade. These disputes were coupled with controversies about the accession of the princely states of Junagadh, Hyderabad, and Jammu and Kashmir, and the outbreak of the first Kashmir war (1947-48). The ill-will generated by these problems was reinforced by the concentration of Indian troops on the border in the Punjab in 1950-51, when an armed conflict was narrowly averted. On top of this were the statements of a number of Indian leaders, including those belonging to the ruling Congress party, regretting the establishment of Pakistan; some even talked about the reunification of India and Pakistan.
What compounded Pakistan's security concerns were Afghanistan's irredentist claims on Pakistani territory. Refusing to recognise Pakistan's sovereignty over North West Frontier Province (NWFP) and Baluchistan, the Afghanistan government made divergent claims on these provinces, which ranged from a demand for the right of self determination for Pushtuns/Pathans living in Pakistan and establishment of an independent state comprising NWFP and Baluchistan, to the incorporation of parts of these provinces into Afghanistan. India endorsed Afghanistan's irredentist claims on Pakistan, and, in the mid-1950s, the Soviet Union extended a similar suppor t to Afghanistan in
Relations with India
Relations with Afghanistan
10
1947-
1953-62: Alignment with the West
The second phase of Pakistan's foreign policy was characterised by a transition from an independent foreign policy to a multifaceted alignment with the West. Pakistan entered into a number of security arrangements with the United States and obtained economic and military assistance from that source which entangled Pakistan in the Cold War between the U. and the Soviet Union.
Pakistan's alignment policy was shaped primarily by its acute sense of insecurity within the regional context. Pakistan's security problems primarily with India and secondarily with Afghanistan were catalyst to Pakistan's frantic search for allies. The deepening economic crisis in the early 1950s also contributed to this decision. In early 1952, the prices of jute and cotton began to drop in the International market which adversely affected Pakistan's foreign trade. The foreign exchange earnings and gold and sterling reserves dwindled. Pakistan was also faced with a serious shortage of wheat in 1952-53. The United States came for Pakistan's rescue by offering a gift of wheat in 1953 which helped to overcome food shortages and built a lot of goodwill in Pakistan for the donor.
Several other factors pushed Pakistan towards alignment with the United States. Pakistan suffered from a sense of isolation in the World. The efforts to promote unity in the Muslim World were not making headway. It also became clear that the UN and the Commonwealth would not facilitate the solution of the Pakistan-India problems, especially the Kashmir dispute.
The choice of the United States was not surprising. Apar t from the U. willingness to offer assistance as a part of its global strategy for the containment of Communism, Pakistan leaders had already given ample evidence of their pro-West disposition. Their distrust of the Soviet Union was quite known which was reinforced by the unearthing of a pro-Soviet 'Rawalpindi Conspiracy' (1951) to dislodge the government in Pakistan. Liaquat Ali Khan's successors were politically weak and they thought that American economic and military aid would reinforce their position in the body politic.
The top-brass of the military made a significant contribution towards building Pakistan-U. relationship. They put their
Alignment with the West
weight in favour of the United States because, in their opinion, the West was more advanced in economic and technical fields and that the West had sufficient resources and determination to support its allies.
In February 1954, Pakistan agreed on the U. initiative to develop close cooperation with Turkey in the political, economic and cultural spheres. A formal Turkey-Pakistan Agreement was signed in April 1954, followed by a Mutual Defence Assistance Agreement between the United States and Pakistan in May. The Unites States agreed to provide military equipment, training facilities and other related services to enable Pakistan to maintain “its international security, its legitimate self-defence or to permit it to participate in the defence of a area or in the United Nations collective security arrangements and measures.” Pakistan was obliged not to use the assistance provided under this agreement for undertaking “any act of aggression against any other nation.” It could not use this assistance for purposes other than those specified in the agreement.
In September 1954, Pakistan joined the South East Asia Treaty Organisation (SEATO) or the Manila Pact. Its members (Australia, France, Great Britain, New Zealand, Pakistan, Philippines, Thailand and the U.) undertook to develop capacity “to resist attack and counter subversive activities” and promote cooperation for “economic progress and social well being.” They pledged that an armed aggression or threat to territorial integrity of a member state would be considered a threat to all, and that they would consult each other in order to meet such a challenge. The United States made it clear that the SEATO pledge applied only to communist aggression or subversion. Pakistan's plea to include all kinds of aggression was not accepted.
One year later (September 1955) Pakistan joined the Baghdad Pact (renamed CENTO in 1959 after Iraq's withdrawal). Pakistan attached greater impor tance to this pact because it involved three Muslim states, i. Iraq (up to 1959), Turkey and Iran. Great Britain was also its member; the United States maintained close links with it and participated in its military committee. The members of the Baghdad Pact agreed to cooperate with each other in the field of defence and security. The United States made it clear
Mutual Defence Assistance Agreement
SEATO
The Baghdad Pact/CENTO
1947-
12
that its participation in the military committee and assistance for strengthening the defensive capability of the member states pertained “solely to communist menace and [carried] no connotations with respect to intra-area matters.”
A Bilateral Agreement of Cooperation was signed between Pakistan and the United States in March 1959, as an executive understanding. Its preamble declared that the United States regarded “as vital to its national interest and to world peace, the preservation of independence and integrity of Pakistan.” Article 2 of the Agreement provided that the United States would supply military and economic assistance to Pakistan as may be mutually agreed upon “in order to assist the government of Pakistan in the preservation of its national independence and integrity and in the effective promotion of its economic development.” Pakistan reciprocated by providing a communication/air base to the United States at Badaber, near Peshawar, for ten years: 1959-69.
Pakistan's alignment with the United States yielded several advantages. American economic assistance grants, loans, goods and services gave a boost to Pakistan's faltering economy. The most significant contribution was in the field of defence and security where the two states developed very close ties. Pakistan received grant assistance valued at US $ 650 million, and credit facilities worth US $ 55 million. The military assistance included arms and ammunition, artillery pieces, APCs, and transport for the Army; aircraft F-104, B-57, F-86, and C-130 for the Air Force; naval defence equipment, including warships; radar and communication equipment. The U. Military Assistance Advisory Group (USMAAG) was set up in Pakistan to advise and guide the modernisation of the armed forces and the security arrangements. A number of divisions were reequipped, and a few new ones were raised, coupled with the restructuring of the defence system. Training facilities in Pakistan were improved and a good number of Pakistan military officers were sent to the United States on different training courses; Pakistan's Air Force and the Navy took part in joint CENTO exercises which enabled them to gain invaluable experience.
The alignment with the West was not cost-free. Pakistan's independent foreign policy was compromised and the prospects for improvement of its relations with the Soviet
Defence and Economic Assistance from the U.S.
Cost of Alignment with the West
Union suffered heavily. The Soviet leaders were extremely perturbed by this development and they resorted to a two- pronged strategy against Pakistan. First, the Soviet leaders made a blistering criticism of Pakistan's alignment with the U. and threatened Pakistan with dire consequences if Pakistan allowed its territory to be used against the Soviet Union. Second, they extended support to India on the Kashmir question, describing it an integral par t of India. They also supported Afghanistan's irredentist claims on Pakistani territory.
Pakistan's participation in defence pacts came in conflict with its desire to cultivate close and cordial relations with the Muslim states. With the exception of Iran and Turkey which shared the defence arrangements, the Middle Eastern states responded negatively to Pakistan's security ties with the West.
Pakistan also lost ground with the developing countries. Pakistan was very active in organising the Bandung Conference in 1955 but, when the spirit of Bandung crystallised into the Nonaligned Movement (NAM) in 1961, Pakistan was excluded because of its participation in defence pacts. Earlier, it adopted an ambiguous policy towards the Suez crisis, 1956, which alienated Egypt. It kept its relations with the socialist/communist countries at a low-level in order to strengthen its credentials as a Western ally.
Despite Pakistan's respect for the U. security sensitivities, the latter was not prepared to extend enough diplomatic support to Pakistan in its problems with India This raised doubts in Pakistan about the credibility of American support. If Pakistanis were sceptical of American commitment, questions were raised in the United States as early as 1957 about the advisability of relying on Pakistan as a defender of American interest vis-à-vis the Soviet Union. However, the two sides played down their difference and continued to cooperate with each other for different reasons.
China avoided an open condemnation of Pakistan's participation in these pacts and showed a remarkable understanding of the factors that led Pakistan to join the Western camp. However, Pakistan maintained a safe distance from China and its policy on the seating of China in the UN wavered; it was more in line with the U. Perspective.
Relations with China
1947-
13
Pakistan International Airlines (PIA) resumed its regular air service to china on April 29, 1964. A similar air service was started for Moscow in the same month.
Pakistan began to plead for the seating for china in the UN and supported China in its effor ts to neutralise American efforts to isolate it at the international level. Chinese were equally supportive of Pakistan's independence and territorial integrity.
Zhou Enlai declared Chinese support to the right of self determination for the people of Kashmir during his visit to Pakistan in February 1964. They reaffirmed their solidarity with Pakistan during Ayub Khan's visit to Beijing in March 1965, and stood by Pakistan during the latter's war with India, first in the Rann of Kutch area (April-May 1965), and then the full-fledged armed conflict (September 1965). They also began to supply weapons and military equipment to Pakistan in early 1966.
The scope of Pakistan-China cooperation continued to extend in the diplomatic, economic (including trade), security, and cultural fields in the subsequent years. The visits of Chinese President Liu Chao Chi, and Foreign Minister, Chen Yi (March 1966), Zhou Enlai (stopover visit in June 1966), President Yahya Khan (November 1970) and several senior military officers, showed that they attached importance to their bilateral relations, and consulted each other regularly on matters of mutual interest.
The United States was unhappy over Pakistani's efforts to improve its relations with the Soviet Union and China. The United States described the Sino-Pakistan air agreement as “an unfortunate breach of the free world solidarity.” It advised Pakistan not to invite Zhou EnLai for an official visit in 1964. Pakistan did not listen to the U. advice. The latter retaliated by withdrawing the offer of financial assistance for the construction of a new airport at Dhaka; Ayub Khan's schedule visit to the U in April 1965 was postponed. The same happened with the meeting of the Aid-to-Pakistan Consortium which was to consider Pakistan's request for aid for the Third Five Year Plan.
The divergence between the two states widened as Pakistan was unable to invoke any security arrangement with the United States during the course of its war with India in September 1965. The United States imposed an arms
Diminishing Ties with the U.
embargo on South Asia which adversely affected Pakistan's combat effectiveness because, unlike India, Pakistan's defence procurement was almost entirely American. The embargo was partly eased in March 1966 to allow the sale of non-lethal military equipment (i. trucks, medical and engineering supplies and communication items). One year later, the United States allowed the sale of spare parts for the military equipment supplied in the past. No new combat equipment was allowed to be sold to either country but Pakistan was provided with some arms and equipment during 1970-71 as a 'special one time exception' extended by President Nixon. A total embargo was re-imposed when a new war broke out between Pakistan and India in November 1971.
Pakistan procured weapons and military equipment from several non-American sources. China was the most important source of supply of weapons in the post- war period. Some equipment was secured through Iran and Turkey. It also secured weapons from France, Great Britain, West Germany, Italy and the Soviet Union. Pakistan also decided to pay more attention to indigenous production of weapons and defence equipment.
Pakistan, thus, moved away from the policy of alignment with the West to an independent and pluralist perspective on foreign relations. It vowed to cultivate mutually advantageous bilateral relations with all states irrespective of their ideological disposition and argued that its interaction with one state would neither influence its relations with any other state nor were these ties directed against any particular state.
Thus, while expanding its relations with the Soviet Union and China, it did not abandon its membership of the U. sponsored pacts, although their impor tance was downgraded. It was Pakistan's determination to pursue an independent foreign policy that it did not endorse Asian Collective Security System advocated by the Soviet Union in 1969. This proposal envisaged the establishment of a Soviet-oriented collectivity of states in the backdrop of the widening rift between the Soviet Union and China. Pakistan, having developed distaste for bloc politics, could not be inclined towards this proposal. Moreover, Pakistan had cultivated very friendly and cordial relations with China and it did not want to be a party to any political networking directly or indirectly aimed at China.
Pluralistic Perspective
1947-
15
Relations with India
Crisis in East Pakistan and International Response
Pakistan's relations with India continued to be characterised by the conflicting national aspirations and mutual distrust. The Kashmir problem was the major stumbling block in the normalisation of their relations. Six rounds of talks were held between the Foreign Ministers of India and Pakistan on Kashmir during December 1962 and May 1963 on the initiate of the UK and the U. These talks proved inconclusive because the two sides refused to show any flexibility in their positions on Kashmir.
Pakistan and India engaged in three wars during this period. The first war was limited to the Rann of Kutch, an area situated on the Sindh-Gujarat border, in April-May 1965. This was followed by a full-blown war in September 1965, involving three services of the armed forces. India and Pakistan again went to war against the backdrop of the civil strife in the then East Pakistan in November-December 1971. This war came to an end when Pakistani troops surrendered to Indian troop in East Pakistan on 16 December 1971. East Pakistan emerged as an independent state of Bangladesh.
The Soviets were disappointed by Pakistan's response to the Asian Collective Security Plan which brought about a degree of restraint in their interaction with Pakistan. They did not, therefore, hesitate to send a terse letter to President Yahya Khan after Pakistan embarked on military action in East Pakistan (Bangladesh) on March 25, 1971. The Soviets were also perturbed by Pakistan's role in bringing about Sino-American rapprochement in July 1971 which set the stage for U. President Nixon's visit to Beijing in February 1972. The Soviets perceived this as the beginning of a Sino-American understanding to their determent. Since Pakistan was instrumental to the establishment of these ties, the Soviets decided to fall back on India to pressure Pakistan. The Soviet foreign Minister visited New Delhi in August 1971 and signed the Treaty of Friendship and Cooperation which encouraged India to adopt a more strident policy towards the civil strife in East Pakistan. India invoked Article 9 of this treaty in October to secure concrete Soviet support for its policy on the East Pakistan (Bangladesh) crisis. The Soviets not only extended diplomatic support but also airlifted arms and equipment to strengthen India's interventionary policies in East Pakistan and its invasion in November 1971. Accusing Pakistan of resorting to aggression against India, the Soviet Union
exercised veto power thrice in the UN Security Council on December 5, 6, and 13, 1971, to stall a ceasefire resolution, which gave India enough time to overrun East Pakistan.
The United States and China did not endorse Pakistan's military action in East Pakistan but they avoided any public criticism of Pakistan's policies. Expressing support for the territorial integrity of Pakistan, the United States endeavoured to encourage Pakistan to seek a political solution to the Bangladesh crisis. Similarly, China extended strong diplomatic suppor t to Pakistan but advised for a political settlement of the problem.
1947-
16
programme towards the end of this phase. The U. reaffirmed support to Pakistan's independence and territorial integrity, and Z. Bhutto visited the U. in September 1973 and February 1975 which contributed to reinforcing their bilateral relations. The U. withdrew the arms embargo in stages: sale of non-lethal equipment and spare parts in 1973; and cash sale of weapons on case by case basis in 1975 - a decision welcomed by Pakistan.
Sharp difference arose between Pakistan and the U. when, in 1976, Pakistan entered into an agreement with France to acquire a nuclear reprocessing plant. Viewing this as a move on Pakistan's part to acquire nuclear weapons capability, the U. worked towards blocking the deal and took several steps to make its displeasure on Pakistan's nuclear policy known to Pakistan: withdrawal of A-7 aircraft offer (1977), suspension of new economic assistance and military sales (1977-78), exclusion of Pakistan from President Carter's trip to Asia when he visited, inter alia, Iran and India (December 1977-January 1978). In 1978, the U. succeeded in convincing France to withdraw from the agreement for supplying a nuclear reprocessing plant to Pakistan.
When the U. discovered that Pakistan was secretly working on setting up uranium enrichment facility at Kahuta, it suspended all economic assistance and military sales to Pakistan in April 1979. On top of this was the burning down of the U. embassy in Islamabad in November 1979 by a mob, consisting mainly of the students, which pushed Pakistan-U. relations to the lowest-ever point.
Pakistan's relations with the Muslim states, particularly the states of the Middle East, touched new heights of cordiality and trust. These relations served Pakistan's diplomatic, economic and security needs in the post-1971 period. The states of the Middle East, especially the states of the Gulf region, extended economic assistance (investment, grants, and loans on soft terms) and diplomatic support to Pakistan. They accommodated Pakistani human-power, which brought a financial bonanza for Pakistan.
Nuclear Technology and Relations with the U.
Pakistan and the Muslim World
1947-
18
1980-90: Afghanistan and Partnership with the
United States
The Soviet military intervention in Afghanistan on December 27, 1979 was an event of far-reaching geo-political ramifications. Pakistan viewed this development as a violation of independence and sovereignty of a neighbouring, non-aligned, and Muslim state by a superpower. As Pakistan's relations with the Soviet Union were often marred by strains, it felt threatened by the idea of having to put up with a massive Soviet military presence in the neighbourhood, dreading direct military pressure or a more active Soviet support to the dissident elements in Baluchistan and NWFP.
Pakistan demanded the withdrawal of Soviet troops from Afghanistan and supported the Afghan groups, described as Afghan Mujahideen, in their bid to dislodge the Soviets from Afghanistan. It allowed them to function from Pakistani territory and accommodated over 3 million Afghan refugees who poured into Pakistan within a year of Soviet military intervention in Afghanistan.
The Afghanistan war proved a turning point in Pakistan-U. relations which moved from the lowest point of 1979 to close political, economic and security ties in the 1980s. The U. offered two packages of economic assistance and military sales to support Pakistan's role in the war against the Soviet troops in Afghanistan. Some additional assistance was provided outside of these packages.
The first six-year assistance package (1981-87) amounted to US $ 3 billion, equally divided between economic assistance and military sales. The U. also sold 40 F- aircraft to Pakistan during 1983-87 at a cost of US $ 1. billion outside the assistance package. Pakistan paid this amount in cash partly from its resources and partly from the funds provided by friendly Arab states.
The second six-year assistance package (1987-93) amounted to US $ 4 billion. Out of this US $ 2 billion were allocated for economic assistance in the form of grants or loan that carried the interest rate of 2-3 per cent. The rest of the allocation (US $ 1 billion) was in the form of credit for military purchases. The new relationship with the U. increased its presence and influence in Pakistan
Soviet Invasion of Afghanistan
Revival of Pakistan-U. Relations
and the latter developed close ties with the U. Central Command (Centcom) without formally joining it. Pakistan's Inter-Services Intelligence (ISI) and the U. Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) worked together in passing on weapons, military training and financial support to Afghan resistance groups. They encouraged the volunteers from the Arab states to join the Afghan resistance in its struggle against the Soviet troops based in Afghanistan.
Despite a close Pakistan-U cooperation on Afghanistan, they diverged on Pakistan's nuclear programme, although the United States downplayed this issue and ignored Pakistan's stride in the nuclear field in order to keep Pakistan on board for the Afghan war.
Pakistan-China relations maintained their steady march towards greater cordiality and a wide ranging cooperation in various fields. China extended full support to Pakistan in its interaction with India and endorsed Pakistan's position on the Afghanistan crisis. The barter trade through the Karakoram Highway expanded and China assisted Pakistan in agriculture, nuclear technology, power generation and heavy industry, especially the defence-related industry.
Pakistan maintained cordial relations with the Muslim states which extended support at the bilateral level and through the Organisation of the Islamic Conference (OIC) to Pakistan on the Afghanistan issue. Some of the Muslim countries donated cash and goods for helping the Afghan refugees living in Pakistan. New agreements for expansion of trade, promotion of economic and technological cooperation, and establishment of joint economic commissions were signed with several Islamic countries.
A major problem faced by Pakistan in its relations with the Muslim world was that it got identified with conservative, monarchical and pro-U. regimes in the Middle East and its relations cooled off with radical and nationalist states like Libya, Syria and Iraq.
Pakistan-India relations were marked by the simultaneous pursuance of positive and negative interaction. There were periods of goodwill and relative harmony but these were short-lived. However, the redeeming feature of their diplomacy was that they never stopped talking on the
Pakistan-China Relations
Pakistan and the OIC
Pakistan-India: a policy of Dialogues
1947-
19
Pakistan foreign policy 1947-2004
Course: Financial Management (FN440)
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