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The Bosnian War 2 0 - Aaa
Relazioni internazionali (103597)
Università degli Studi di Siena
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The Bosnian War (1992-1995): A case study.
Written by: Bryan Zomparelli, ID: 16029730
Written for: GI
Date of completion: 23/05/
TABLE OF CONTENTS
- Introduction
- Origins of the conflict 2 Multiethnicity 2 Greater Serbia and Serbian nationalism
- State actors 3 Serbia 3 Bosnia-Hercegovina 3 United States
- Intergovernmental actors 4 United Nations 4 NATO
- Conflict Resolution Process 5 The European conferences 5 Mediation’s mutilated victory and flawed agreement 5 Partition agreement outcome
- Ripeness theory and the end of the war 6 US and IGOS policy change 6 Ripeness theory: The Endgame strategy
- The Dayton Peace Agreement
- Conclusions
1
The inter-state conflict between Bosnia-Hercegovina and its former allies it constituted Yugoslavia with, is the result of its request for independence and recognition, as well as the tensions due to its multi-ethnic nature. Being recognised as one of the most violent conflicts which took place in Europe after WWII, the conflict broke out in 1992 and got to an end with the Dayton Agreement in 1995, after 102 were killed (Hayden, 2007). The intent of this case study is to analyse the reasons which led to the war breakout, to individuate the actors involved, the reasons of the ineffectiveness of the conflict resolution approaches prior to 1995 and the outcomes of the 1995 Dayton Agreement.
2 of the conflict
2 MULTIETHNICITY
Yugoslavia was created during the aftermath of World War I, with the unification of Bosnian, Croat and Slovenian territories, which used to be part of the Austro-Hungarian Empire, with the Serbian Kingdom. During World War II the country got broke up by the occupation of the Nazi forces and got reunified during the global conflict’s aftermath when Josip Broz Tito liberated the country with his partisan forces. Despite being a deliberately communist state, Yugoslavia escaped from USSR’s geographical area of influence, became one of the founding members of the Non-Aligned Movement in 1961 and became one of the most tolerant communist governments of the Cold War Eastern Europe. Between 1990 and 1991 the constituent states of Yugoslavia began to claim for independence, finally obtaining it (History.state, n.). Bosnia, unlike the other newly formed Balkan states, narrowly followed the procedures imposed by European Community to secure its recognition. The process, which was supported by the United States, led to a referendum which took place in March 1991 and whose outcome ratified the Bosnian independence (Ali and Lifschultz, 1993). However, despite the majority of the population expressed itself, the outcome of the referendum led to social disorders linked to the multi-ethnic nature of Bosnia’s social structure. Since 1971 Muslims, used as a noun to indicate a national identity, were the largest ethnical group in Bosnia and after the emigration of many Serbs and Croats between 1971 and 1991, according to the 1991 census “Muslims made up more than two fifths of the Bosnian population” (Lampe, n.). In states characterised by multiple ethnic identities considered unchangeable since inherited, when political choices are dictated by ethnicity, inevitably the ethnic minority corresponds to the political minority. For this reason the politicization of a demographic minority’s difference in a majoritarian system is ineffective if it tries to pursue benefits “through the legal institutionalised track; instead they have an incentive to defy the established rules” and are encouraged to establish new
3 BOSNIA-HERCEGOVINA
Bosnia-Hercegovina was a former state of Yugoslavia. It was the most multi-ethnic of the Balkan countries characterised by a cosmopolitan way of life. People from different heritages lived peacefully together for many years, who considered themselves Bosnians regardless of their roots (Jones, 1993). Bosnia claimed independence and obtained it in 1992 with a referendum which proved to be extremely costly. Bosnia’s request for independence was the result of a fatal miscalculation made by the government. Alija Izetbegovic, the Bosnian President, relied on an eventual intervention by the United States and the European Community in case of a war breakout, but history proved his calculations to be flawed, as both Europe and the US did not intervene, despite they recognised the state’s right to self-determination. Due to this miscalculation Bosnia was not ready to defend its territories and suffered the Serb initiative (Ali and Lifschultz, 1993).
3 UNITED STATES
The United States opted for a non-interventionist policy towards Bosnia, dictated by the realist principle of self-interest (Dunne, Kurki and Smith, 2016). The debate on whether to deploy a considerable number of soldiers, which would have had a considerable cost, or not has been on President Clinton’s agenda for long time. The final decision has been to not intervene, since, as claimed by Arthur Schlesinger Jr. (1993) American interests were not threatened.
4 ACTORS
4 UNITED NATIONS
The United Nations, as well as the United States, acted in a very despicable way. In September 1991, the United Nations Security Council passed the Resolution 713, that “imposed an arms embargo on the still extant Yugoslavia”, under Belgrade’s request (Ali and Lifschultz, p, 1993). This resolution evidently favoured Serbia, as it had the monopoly of heavy guns, thus making the process of ethnic purification easier. In December 1992, the General Assembly realised that the UN 713 was harming the Bosnian population and voted in order to lift the embargo, as it was in contrast with the Article 51 of the UN Charter, which recognised a state’s right to self-defence. Despite the General Assembly voted in favour of the revoke of UN 713, the UNSC ignored the request. Instead, the UNSC opted for the establishment of six safe areas on the Bosnian territory, beginning a process of ghettoization, which represented the umpteenth violation of the Geneva Convention (Ali and Lifschultz, 1993). Finally, after the massacre of Srbrenica, in 1994 the UN decided not to limit its involvement to humanitarian aid, but to use force by requesting NATO to intervene.
4 NATO
NATO initially adopted a non-interventionist policy too. However, after the massacre of Srbrenica’s safe area, in 1994 it intervened for the first time by shooting down four Bosnian Serb aircrafts which did not respect the UN imposed no-fly zone. Between 1994 and 1995 NATO launched a series of attacks, which resulted to be fundamental to reach the Dayton Agreement (Lampe, n.).
5 resolution process
5 THE EUROPEAN CONFERENCES
The London Conference took place in the capital of England in August 1992. This conference represents the first attempt to reach a peaceful solution between Serbia and Bosnia since the breakout of the hostilities in April 1992. The conference was meant to set a turning point in the Bosnian War, as Serbs seemed to be willing to cooperate to reach a settlement with the state whose population they were exterminating. The London Conference set the underlying principles on which any future political settlement had to be based on, including: the recognition of Bosnia-Hercegovina by every former Yugoslav state, the end of all hostilities, the consignment of heavy guns under UN’s control and the return of all territories obtained with force (The Independent, 1992). Eventually the London Conference had a positive outcome, as it recognised Bosnia-Hercegovina’s sovereignty and identified Serbia as the aggressor, posing a good basis for future talks. The negotiations resumed in the Geneva Conference, which took place in September 1992, just one month after the London Conference. The Geneva Conference, which was meant to implement London’s agreements, saw the intervention of two mediators: “Cyrus R. Vance for the United Nations and Lord Owen for the European Community” (Binder, 1993). The work made by Vance and Owen led to the “evisceration” (Ali and Lifschultz, p, 1993) of the key features which constituted the basis for a settlement.
5 MEDIATION’S MUTILATED VICTORY AND FLAWED AGREEMENT
Ten months after the London Conference and the recognition of Bosnia-Hercegovina as a sovereign state and the victim of the war, Owen claimed to support Milosevic-Tudjman’s plan for the partition of Bosnia. After Serbia’s missed accomplishment of the implementation of London’s arrangements, Owen and Vance were supposed to interrupt any negotiation and to make sure that adequate countermeasures were taken, in order to defend a UN member, instead they supported the solution proposed by the head of state of the nation which has been identified as the aggressor in London. The emissaries of the two intergovernmental organization seemingly applied the never paying policy of appeasement, which consists in making concessions to an upset country, in order to avoid war. However the policy of the stick and the carrot will never lead to a positive outcome
outpost with air strikes. The initiative resulted in “nearly 400 peacekeepers being taken hostage”, recognising that “NATO air strikes would do more harm than good” (Daalder, 1998). UN’s incapability to protect Bosnian Muslims resulted in another massacre in Srebrenica, in which more than 7 were murdered cold bloodedly. The US finally decided that traditional peacekeeping measures proved to be useless up to that point, therefore deciding to adopt a new harsh policy based on severe military intervention. This was due both to the importance that US foreign policy towards Bosnia would have had in the close elections and the impossibility to stand other massacres.
6 RIPENESS THEORY: THE ENDGAME STRATEGY
Anthony Lake has been one of the major architects of the new US policy towards Bosnia, which then proved to be effective. His strategy is known as ‘The Endgame strategy’. Lake realised that Bosnian Serbs would have never accepted a fair settlement until force was used against them, therefore making it clear that a consistent military initiative was necessary. He recognised that UN troops would have been an impediment, thus organising their withdrawal and a subsequent military initiative, which included US, NATO and EU troops. His strategy included the use of the stick and the carrot. The Bosnian territory had to be divided in two areas, with the Bosniaks controlling the 51% of the territory. If Serbs refused the agreement the US would lift the arms embargo, provide arms to Bosniaks and train them, while if Bosniaks refused the agreement the US would lift the arms embargo and leave. After receiving the consensus from both the US president and the European capitals, the Endgame strategy was finally implemented. A series of US led offensives had a positive outcome, reducing the territories under Serb control from 70% to 50%. After a long, wearying war and many casualties from both sides, the ripeness theory had a positive outcome, leading to the signature of the Dayton Agreement in December 1995 (Daalder, 1998).
7 DAYTON PEACE AGREEMENT
The Dayton Peace Agreement is the result of the talks between Bosnia-Hercegovina, Croatia and Yugoslavia for peace in Bosnia. The agreement has four major key points:
- Bosnia-Hercegovina, Croatia and the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia “agree to fully respect the sovereign equality of one another” and the intent to solve settlements peacefully.
- The Federal Republic of Yugoslavia and Bosnia-Hercegovina are mutually recognised and agree to discuss additional aspects of their recognition.
- The parties agree to implement the commitments made in the Annexes and to “respect human rights and the rights of refugees and displaced persons.
- “The parties agree to cooperate fully with all entities”, in carrying out the peace settlements and to prosecute war crimes and other violations of the Geneva Conventions.
(Hrlibrary.umn, n.) 23 years after the signature of the agreement, it is easy to say whether it obtained good results or not. To some extent it did and to some other it did not. During the conflict’s aftermath the agreement secured stability, peacekeeping and disarmament. A reconstruction programme went on thanks to international financial aid, the IDs and common passports were accepted, a common currency was created, a unified army and intelligence services were established. However, the agreement also had a flip side of the coin. Continued ethnic identification required a consistent international involvement, thus creating a confused bureaucratic system. The fact that the country is split in two parts, cements the differences. Continuous international interventions undermine the credibility of the Bosnian institutions. Furthermore the multiplicity of the institutions prevents Bosnia from having same standards on pensions, health and instruction (Pasic, 2015).
8
The Bosnian War has been an extremely bloody conflict, driven by racial, political and territorial claims. The conflict, which broke out in 1992 might have been prevented or, at least, be quickly brought to an end, if the international community adopted the Humanitarian intervention and right to protect theory. Unfortunately this theory has been theorised in the 21 st century, in order to prevent other genocides. State and intergovernmental actors played a key role both adopting a non-interventionist and an interventionist policy. However an early intervention might have allowed the ripeness theory to be effective much earlier. Even the adoption of the deterrence theory, allowing Bosnia to defend itself by lifting the embargo might have had a positive outcome. The war lasted so long, also because of the ineffectiveness of the negotiation approaches used by the EC and UN mediators. Furthermore their approaches have been spoiled by the fact that reaching an agreement seemed to be more important than the agreement itself and, because of that they agreed to set a process of partition in motion, even though it was impossible to divide such a well amalgamated society based on ethnicity. Finally the policy change by the US led to a turning point whose consequences led to the Dayton Peace Agreement signature. The agreement initially seemed to be effective, but eventually proved to be flawed. Conclusively the Bosnian war generally represents a failure of the international society, but it has to be regarded as a starting point to learn from previous mistakes.
BIBLIOGRAPHY
balkanalysis/bosnia/2015/11/20/twenty-years-on-can-the-dayton-agreement-be- considered-a-success-story/ [Accessed 23 May 2018].
Schlesinger, A. (1993). How To Think About Bosnia. The Wall Street Journal.
The Independent. (1992). Conference Statement on Bosnia: Text of the final declaration of the. [online] Available at: independent.co/news/world/europe/conference-statement- on-bosnia-text-of-the-final-declaration-of-the-london-conference-regarding-the-1542891 [Accessed 21 May 2018].
The Bosnian War 2 0 - Aaa
Corso: Relazioni internazionali (103597)
Università: Università degli Studi di Siena
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